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  Recent years have seen a significant expansion in the criminal justice 
system’s use of various preemptive measures, aimed to prevent harm before 
it occurs. This development consists of adopting a myriad of prophylactic 
statutes, including endangerment crimes, which target behaviors that 
merely pose a risk of future harm but are not in themselves harmful at the 
time they are committed. 
  This Article demonstrates that a significant portion of these 
endangerment crimes criminalize various forms of speech and expression. 
Examples include conspiracies, attempts, verbal harassment, instructional 
speech on how to commit crimes, and possession crimes. The Article argues 
that in contrast with conventional wisdom’s assumption that the right to 
free speech is broadly protected under existing jurisprudence, much speech 
is currently overcriminalized under the endangerment justification. Free 
speech doctrines and criminal law are in tension with one another. While 
under its First Amendment jurisprudence the Court contracts government’s 
power to ban speech, criminal law constantly expands the scope of speech 
crimes. 
  The Article contends that existing doctrines attempting to explain this 
inconsistency fail to provide a principled explanation for the absence of 
First Amendment scrutiny from various types of speech crimes. To 
ameliorate this problem, this Article proposes a unified analytical 
framework for assessing when speech justifies criminalization and when it 
warrants constitutional protection. The proposal suggests that all speech 
crimes should be subject to constitutional scrutiny under free speech 
doctrines, as well as to additional constraints stemming from criminal law 
theory. This Article provides several factors to guide the judicial inquiry 
into determining the scope of criminal bans on speech. 
 
 †  Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee School of Law. S.J.D., University 
of Virginia School of Law, 2010. My deepest gratitude to A. Benjamin Spencer for his invaluable 
comments on several drafts of this Article and for devoting enormous time and effort to 
providing me feedback on this piece. I am also grateful to the following scholars for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts: Aaron Caplan, Nora Demleitner, Mark Drumbl, Erik Luna, Timothy 
MacDonnell, Ann Massie, Brian Murchison, Doug Rendleman, Larry Solum, and Joan 
Shaughnessy. Thank you also to the participants of Washington and Lee’s Faculty Workshop for 
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Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the Shadow . . . .1 
INTRODUCTION 
Tarek Mehanna, a twenty-two-year-old Muslim-American citizen, 
was living in Massachusetts and studying towards a doctorate degree in 
pharmacy.2 A devoted scholar of Islam, Mehanna began to translate 
Arab-language materials into English. He then posted his translations 
on al-Tibyan, an Islamic website that comprised an online community 
for those sympathetic to al-Qaeda and Jihadi perspectives. Website 
members shared opinions, videos, and texts in online forums. The 
translated writings, which were already available on the Internet, varied 
significantly in their potential link to terrorism, ranging from some al-
Qaeda–generated media and materials supportive of al-Qaeda and/or 
jihad, such as instructing readers to “ask God for martyrdom” and to 
“Go for Jihad Yourself,” to more innocuous writings loosely tethered to 
the jihad movement, such as maintaining physical fitness.3 
In 2009, Mehanna, who had no prior criminal record, was arrested 
on terrorism-related charges.4 The government argued, among others, 
that the translated writings provided a service to al-Qaeda, because its 
purpose was to spur readers on to jihad and inspire al-Qaeda supporters 
to commit terrorist acts.5 On December 19, 2011, a Massachusetts jury 
convicted Mehanna of four terrorism-related charges, including 
conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist 
organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.6 The district court 
sentenced Mehanna to a prison term of 210 months.7 On November 13, 
 
 1 T.S. ELIOT, THE HOLLOW MEN (1925), reprinted in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS: 
1909–1950, at 56, 58 (1971). 
 2 United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 3 See MUHAMMAD BIN AHMAD AS-SĀLIM, 39 WAYS TO SERVE AND PARTICIPATE IN JIHĀD 
(At-Tibyān Publ’ns trans.), available at https://ia700408.us.archive.org/7/items/39WaysToServe
AndParticipate/39WaysToServeAndParticipateInJihad.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2015) (providing 
the full-text English language translation of the Arabic document, which is publicly available on 
numerous Islamic Internet sites). 
 4 Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 41. 
 5 Id. (charges against Mehanna “were based on two separate clusters of activities”: one 
centered on his travel to Yemen, in search of an al-Qaeda training camp, the other was 
“translation-centric”). 
 6 Id. at 42. 
 7 Id. 
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2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld Mehanna’s 
conviction and sentence.8 
Mehanna’s translation-centered conviction raises some vexing 
questions concerning how we distinguish between speech that warrants 
criminal prohibition and speech that ought to be protected against 
criminal sanctions by the First Amendment. As the case poignantly 
illustrates, making this distinction can be difficult. Convicting Mehanna 
with conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist 
organization based on translation into Arabic of materials that praise 
terrorist acts, raises significant concerns about how and the extent to 
which speech is criminalized. Concerns about the scope of speech-based 
criminal prohibitions extend beyond the terrorism context. Other 
examples include criminalizing a host of risk-creation conducts, 
ostensibly to prevent future harm. These statutes range from 
conspiracies and attempts to instructional speech providing information 
useful for the commission of crimes. Indeed, when one reviews the 
broad array of instances in which speech is now criminalized, it begins 
to seem as if speech has become overcriminalized. 
The overcriminalization of speech parallels a broader trend in 
substantive criminal law, which has undergone an unprecedented 
expansion in recent years.9 The “overcriminalization phenomenon” as 
commentators have dubbed it, is the tendency for a constantly growing 
array of criminal statutes to make individuals liable for conviction and 
punishment for a wider range of behaviors.10 Scholars have identified 
four principal manifestations of this phenomenon. First, federalization 
of crimes, the explosive growth in the scope and size of federal criminal 
offenses.11 Second, overlapping crimes, namely, re-criminalizing conduct 
that has already been proscribed by another statute.12 Third, 
endangerment offenses, where harm is merely threatened but the risk has 
not yet materialized.13 Fourth, ancillary crimes, namely, offenses that 
function as surrogates for the prosecution of primary or core crimes.14 
Although the literature describing this general phenomenon is 
 
 8 Id. at 69. 
 9 See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 3–6 (2008) (discussing the scope of the dramatic expansion in criminal laws). 
 10 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 506, 512–15 (2001) (noting the continual expansion of criminal statutes); see also Erik Luna, 
The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 712–19 (2005) (discussing the 
features of the “overcriminalization phenomenon”). 
 11 See Sara Sun Beale, Essay, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and 
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 753–56 (2005) (discussing the 
overfederalization of criminal law). 
 12 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 36–40. 
 13 Id. In this Article, the phrases “endangerment crimes,” “risk-creation crimes,” and “harm 
prevention crimes” are used interchangeably. 
 14 See Norman Abrams, The New Ancillary Offenses, 1 CRIM. L.F. 1 (1989). 
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extensive, any specific discussion of the overcriminalization of speech is 
notably absent. This Article fills that void. 
As it turns out, one particular category of criminal prohibitions on 
speech—endangerment speech crimes—is the area in which the 
overcriminalization of speech is most prominent and disconcerting. 
Endangerment speech crimes consist of prohibitions that target 
expression that ostensibly increase the likelihood of inflicting future 
harm. Examples include conspiracy to commit terrorism-related crimes, 
criminal bans on verbal harassment, and an array of statutes covering 
disorderly conduct, including prohibitions on public drunkenness and 
expression of profanities in public.15 In recent years, federal and state 
legislatures have expanded the scope of these crimes by prohibiting a 
myriad of crime prevention offenses that target risk-creating speech.16 
The overcriminalization of speech is, therefore, yet another facet of the 
overall overcriminalization phenomenon. 
To some readers, the claim that current laws overcriminalize 
speech may seem highly implausible in light of the popular belief 
concerning the fundamental importance of the right to free speech in 
American constitutional law. A skeptical observer might respond that 
speech not only is not overcriminalized, but also is broadly protected; 
some might even contend over-protected. Indeed, at first blush, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has been strongly protective of speech, beginning with 
the landmark Brandenburg v. Ohio decision—which significantly 
limited the criminalization of advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation only to cases where the speech is “directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action”17—and culminating in the recent decision in United States 
v. Stevens, which struck down a federal statute that criminalized the 
commercial creation, sale, or possession of illegal depictions of 
treatment of animals, considered to be cruel.18 
However, a more nuanced examination of the relationship between 
First Amendment jurisprudence and substantive criminal law reveals 
that this preliminary assumption provides only a partial account of the 
more complex interplay between them. In fact, these two areas of law 
run along two parallel lines: Although under its free speech 
jurisprudence the Court significantly contracts the government’s power 
to adopt content-based restrictions on speech, at the same time, 
substantive criminal law continuously expands restrictions on speech 
via broadly-worded speech crimes. 
 
 15 See infra Part I.A–C. 
 16 See infra Part I.A–C. 
 17 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (emphases added). 
 18 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010). 
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The explanation for this seemingly inconsistent treatment of these 
two areas of law lies in the limited boundaries of the First 
Amendment.19 While some speech enjoys First Amendment scrutiny, 
numerous statutes simply fall beyond its reach and are not measured 
against its rigorous standards.20 Existing First Amendment doctrine 
treats many types of speech crimes as categorically falling beyond the 
ambit of First Amendment coverage. Consequently, a wide array of 
crimes—including attempts, conspiracies, solicitations, and 
instructional speech—are not subject to free speech scrutiny. Instead, 
they are viewed as speech acts, an integral part of an illegal course of 
conduct or “speech brigaded with action” (speech acts).21 
Speech acts consist of speech that performs some functional task 
other than the expressive communication of ideas.22 These include 
various forms of expressions that are so intertwined with performative 
actions that they are treated similarly to conduct, rather than pure 
speech. The implications of the speech act classification are far-reaching 
because the First Amendment provides unique protection to speech, 
subjecting regulations of speech to numerous restrictions that 
regulations of conduct need not satisfy, most notably, the stringent strict 
scrutiny review.23 Importantly, speech acts are not viewed as implicating 
the fundamental right to speak and, therefore, are not subject to strict 
scrutiny review.24 Instead, similar to general criminal prohibitions, 
speech acts are subject to only the most lenient judicial review, namely, 
rational basis scrutiny, which is notably deferential to the government.25 
The upshot is that speech acts are categorically excluded from the scope 
of First Amendment coverage.26 
Commentators have long grappled with speech acts doctrines, but 
have yet to provide a single comprehensive theory that explains which 
speech falls within the boundaries of free speech coverage and which 
 
 19 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration 
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004) (noting the limited boundaries of 
the First Amendment). 
 20 Id. at 1771 (providing examples of civil and criminal restrictions on speech that fall beyond 
the scope of the First Amendment). 
 21 See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Unchartered Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 
1283 n.16 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (elaborating on the explanations for the 
exclusion of First Amendment coverage from many speech crimes). 
 22 See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 43, 57 (1989). 
 23 See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 776–78 (2001). 
 24 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1281–84 (discussing examples not subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny). 
 25 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 624 (3d ed. 
2006) (providing examples of the Court upholding legislation using rational basis review). 
 26 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1769 (noting that speech acts are excluded from First 
Amendment coverage). 
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remains beyond its scope.27 One prominent account suggests that 
certain kinds of speech, including offers, agreements, orders, 
permissions, and threats constitute “situation-altering utterances,” 
which are not subject to free speech scrutiny.28 Another explanation 
suggests that certain types of expressions, speech acts among them, are 
categorically excluded from the ambit of the First Amendment.29 The 
latter account further contends that legal doctrines alone are unable to 
explain what speech is covered by the First Amendment and that an 
array of nonlegal factors—such as economic, political, and cultural 
considerations—may explain the lack of free speech coverage from 
various types of speech.30 
Existing doctrines, however, are fraught with difficulties, and are 
unable to provide an analytical framework by which to identify the 
criteria for determining which speech merits constitutional protection. 
Notably, they fail to explain why various speech crimes consisting of 
mere speech, unaccompanied by any action, evade free speech scrutiny, 
even when the expression is prohibited because of its communicative 
message. 
The purpose of this Article is to develop an analytical framework 
for policymakers to determine when it is appropriate to criminalize 
speech. While current accounts tell only a partial story, and one that is 
mostly viewed through the First Amendment lens, this Article focuses 
on the implications of speech crimes from a criminal law perspective by 
revisiting the justifications for these crimes. The main question that it 
asks is when, and to what extent, may speech alone, unaccompanied by 
further acts, constitute the actus reus of a criminal offense? In other 
words, when does pure speech transform into criminal behavior? This 
question has been further sharpened in recent years with the huge 
explosion in cyberspace communication. Its modified version asks: 
When does virtual crime, consisting merely of speech, become a crime 
in the real world? 
To answer this question, I develop several constitutional 
constraints as well as constraints stemming from criminal law theory to 
limit the ambit of speech crimes. The proposed framework suggests a 
two-step analysis. It begins with the premise that the kernel of what 
makes a crime one that criminalizes speech lies in the fact that its actus 
reus is speech of some sort. An initial step in assessing when 
criminalization is warranted would be asking whether the actus reus of 
 
 27 See John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization 
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495–97 (1975). 
 28 See GREENAWALT, supra note 22 (discussing “situation-altering utterances”). 
 29 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1771 (explaining the lack of coverage from certain speech 
restrictions). 
 30 Id. at 1788–89 (elaborating on nonlegal factors relevant to free speech coverage). 
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the crime consists of a content-based restriction on speech. If the statute 
targets speech because of the harm that flows from its content, then the 
criminal prohibition needs to be scrutinized under First Amendment 
doctrines. The second step consists of examining familiar free speech 
considerations that are typically applied when a content-based 
restriction on speech is concerned, such as the value of the speech and 
the type of harm it threatens.31 Importantly, appropriate risk 
management must account for the likelihood that grave harm would be 
inflicted before speech is criminalized. This Article, therefore, proposes 
that a probability test is incorporated into the definition of 
endangerment speech crimes to ensure that speech is criminalized only 
when a cost-benefit analysis demonstrates substantial likelihood of dire 
harm resulting from the speech. From a criminal law perspective, 
incorporating a probability requirement assures that speech is 
criminalized only if the perpetrator’s dangerousness is established. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains how speech is 
currently overcriminalized and elaborates on the problems that have 
arisen under existing statutes. It demonstrates that as a part of the 
criminal justice system’s increasing reliance on preemptive law 
enforcement, legislatures adopt a myriad of endangerment speech 
crimes without requiring substantial probability that the speech would 
result in grave harm. This Part further frames the overcriminalization of 
speech argument within the broader context of the overcriminalization 
phenomenon in general and the increasing use of preventive measures 
in criminal law in particular. 
Part II considers existing doctrines that attempt to explain when 
speech should be immune from First Amendment scrutiny. It critiques 
these explanations by contending that they are unable to properly draw 
the legal boundary between speech that warrants constitutional 
protection and one that justifies criminal sanction. This Part concludes 
that since current doctrines are unable to offer a comprehensive account 
of the absence of First Amendment scrutiny from many endangerment 
speech crimes, an alternative doctrinal framework should be adopted to 
evaluate the constitutionality of speech crimes. 
Part III offers several constraints—constitutional ones as well as 
those grounded in substantive criminal law—to limit the scope of 
endangerment speech crimes. It proposes that all speech crimes would 
be subject to both strict scrutiny judicial review and to internal 
constraints stemming from criminal law theory. It further develops a 
number of guidelines that may construct such judicial review and 
alleviate some of the concerns that arise from the overcriminalization of 
speech. 
 
 31 See infra Part III.A.1. 
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I.     HOW SPEECH IS OVERCRIMINALIZED 
In recent years, the paradigm model for law enforcement has 
shifted from reactive enforcement to proactive prevention.32 This was 
done by significantly expanding law enforcement’s prophylactic 
measures and preventive statutes.33 The statutes include inchoate-
anticipatory crimes, i.e., offenses that proscribe conduct that does not 
cause harm at the time it is committed, but creates a risk that increases 
the likelihood that harm will ensue in the future.34 The imposition of 
criminal sanction is justified as a preventive measure, designed to 
preemptively reduce the odds of future harm.35 Examples of risk-
creation crimes fall under three main categories: inchoate offenses 
including conspiracies; solicitations; and attempts, endangerment or 
anticipatory offenses, such as reckless endangerment, prohibitions 
against driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and crimes of 
possession, mainly possession of illicit drugs or weapons.36 
One overlooked feature of risk-creation crimes is that they often 
prohibit various types of speech and expression. Speech tends to be 
criminalized under the rubric of endangerment crimes as part of 
legislatures’ efforts to prevent potentially dangerous future criminal 
conduct. These crimes target the risks that certain speech might 
persuade people to engage in unlawful activities or inform them how to 
engage in such activities. While the speech is not in itself harmful when 
it is expressed, communicating certain messages has the potential to 
result in harmful effects. Many jurisdictions have adopted a myriad of 
endangerment crimes whose actus reus consist of nothing but speech.37 
Examples range from expanding the scope of conspiracy doctrines to 
cover agreements of ambiguous nature, to extending the reach of 
attempt doctrines to criminalize speech that falls short of a substantial 
step to commit a crime, culminating in criminalizing a host of speech-
based harassment and verbal bullying. 
 
 32 See Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive 
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2001) (noting the recent shift in 
criminal justice system towards prevention). 
 33 See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 
(2003) (noting that the Court has recently expanded its understanding of preventive detention). 
 34 See R.A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, in DEFINING CRIMES: ESSAYS ON THE SPECIAL 
PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 43, 51 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2005) (elaborating on the 
justifications for endangerment crimes). 
 35 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 161–62 (discussing the criminalization of risk-creation 
behaviors). 
 36 Id. at 159–77 (providing examples of risk-creation offenses). 
 37 See infra Part I.A–C and accompanying notes. 
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The overcriminalization of speech stems not only from broadly 
worded speech crimes, but also from prosecutorial overreaching.38 The 
risks of abuse of prosecutorial discretion are not limited to the specific 
context of endangerment speech crimes as unchecked prosecutorial 
discretion is sometimes used to reach conducts that do not warrant 
criminal sanction.39 But expansive statutes criminalizing various forms 
of endangerment speech further exacerbate the risks of prosecutorial 
overreaching due to the vagueness, overbreadth, and targeting of 
inchoate conduct that characterize these laws.40 The continual increase 
in preventive crimes in turn facilitates prosecutorial overreaching, 
thereby further contributing to the overcriminalization of speech. 
The overcriminalization of speech has been greatly exacerbated 
over the last two decades due to the unprecedented rise in the use of the 
Internet as the dominant form of communication. This change not only 
has generated new technologies that effectively disseminate various 
forms of speech but also has created new risks flowing from the content 
of such speech.41 The Internet provides a convenient forum for 
individuals who share potentially dangerous interests, such as 
pedophilia, to discuss these ideas and play out their thoughts, 
sometimes converting them into action.42 Moreover, although 
cyberspace communication often includes more traditional one-on-one 
interactions in which the speaker communicates directly with the target 
by sending her private messages through emails or social networking 
sites, the Internet’s primary impact is its ability to effectively reach an 
unlimited and unidentified audience. While under First Amendment 
doctrines, the paradigm “public forum” included only streets and parks, 
the Internet has become the modern equivalent of the “public forum.”43 
The Internet’s unique features, thus, raise novel challenges for the 
criminal law, as the following sections elaborate.44 
The prime example of an endangerment speech crime is advocacy 
of law violation, namely, speech that may lead listeners to commit 
crimes. The constitutionality of such a statute was the issue at stake in 
the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio.45 In 
Brandenburg, the defendant, a Ku Klux Klan leader, invited a journalist 
 
 38 See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1715 & n.1 (2006) 
(noting the relationship between broad statutes and “heavy-handed” law enforcement). 
 39 See Beale, supra note 11 (discussing broader aspects of prosecutorial overreaching). 
 40 See infra Part I.C (discussing prosecutorial overreaching in sexting prosecutions). 
 41 See Susan W. Brenner & Megan Rehberg, “Kiddie Crime”? The Utility of Criminal Law in 
Controlling Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2009) (discussing new risks resulting 
from technological advancements). 
 42 See infra Part I.A.2. 
 43 See Peter Linzer, From the Gutenberg Bible to Net Neutrality—How Technology Makes Law 
and Why English Majors Need to Understand It, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 3 (2008). 
 44 See infra Part I.A–C. 
 45 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
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and a cameraman to a Klan rally, where hooded armed figures marched, 
burning a cross and uttering racist epithets.46 Brandenburg was charged 
and convicted under Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Act prohibiting 
advocacy of crime. The Court, however, struck down the statute on 
overbreadth grounds, finding it to be unconstitutional because it 
punished mere advocacy of unlawful actions, even in circumstances 
where the speaker did not threaten or incite others to commit imminent 
crimes.47 The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove that 
Brandenburg’s speech was likely to cause an imminent public 
disturbance or that Brandenburg had attempted to instigate immediate 
violence.48 For the Ohio legislature, the increased risk that the speech 
would result in any harm—regardless of its likelihood—was sufficient in 
its mind to justify criminal prohibition. But the low likelihood that the 
risk-creating speech would lead to law violation was insufficient for the 
Brandenburg Court, which explicitly rejected criminalization of mere 
endangerment speech. 
Following Brandenburg, a state may interfere with individuals’ 
right to advocate unlawful action only when two requirements are met: 
high likelihood of law violation and imminence of harm. While the 
Brandenburg Court has left the “imminence” requirement ambiguous, 
the Court’s decision in Hess v. Indiana clarified that advocacy of 
violence “at some indefinite future time” is not sufficient to take speech 
outside First Amendment shelter; only a “rational inference” of 
“imminent disorder” will suffice.49 In light of Hess, imminent means 
nothing but immediate action, which is an almost impossible burden to 
satisfy.50 
However, an entirely different picture emerges, one which is far 
less speech protective, when considering a host of other speech crimes. 
The Brandenburg test has been strictly limited to advocacy of crime and 
has not been further extended to related types of endangerment 
speech.51 As the following sections will demonstrate, numerous criminal 
statutes broadly prohibit different types of risk-creating speech, without 
requiring any probability that the speech at issue would result in any 
harm, let alone grave harm, as a prerequisite for criminalization. These 
statutes are not only in tension with Brandenburg’s holding, but also 
raise doubts concerning the justifications for criminalization because 
speech is criminalized despite the lack of evidence concerning the 
 
 46 Id. at 445. 
 47 Id. at 447–49. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1973). 
 50 See GREENAWALT, supra note 22, at 209 (stating that Hess’s interpretation of imminence “is 
very restrictive”). 
 51 See Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 669 
(2009) (noting Brandenburg’s limited application). 
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perpetrator’s dangerousness. Prohibiting the mere potential for future 
harm enables the criminalization of a multitude of risky conducts that 
arguably do not warrant criminal sanctions, thus accounting for the 
overcriminalization of speech. 
While most legal theorists agree that various types of risk-creating 
behaviors justify criminalization, there is a significant controversy 
concerning the extent of criminal liability.52 Commentators note that 
endangerment crimes are too expansive in scope and need to be 
redrafted, or at least subject to more intense judicial scrutiny.53 Several 
scholars have begun to consider limits on endangerment crimes.54 The 
main questions are: how early should the criminal law intervene; and 
when is a given behavior sufficiently dangerous to justify preventive 
criminal intervention? Many commentators agree that endangerment 
crimes should be significantly limited only to offenses that create serious 
risk of harm, requiring substantial probability that harm would occur.55 
A probability assessment considers the causal link between risk-creation 
conduct and actual materialization of harm, supporting criminalization 
only if there is conclusive empirical evidence to establish such nexus.56 
As the following sections demonstrate, many criminal statutes fall short 
of satisfying this requirement.57 
The recent proliferation of endangerment speech crimes calls for 
the adoption of several constraints that might limit their scope. Existing 
proposals for limits on endangerment crimes in general provide the 
analytical foundation for developing a theory specifically designed to 
constrain the scope of speech-based endangerment statutes. This Article 
will revisit these limits in Part III and provide its own proposal for how 
to assess the propriety of criminalizing endangerment speech.58 
Before delving into specific examples of endangerment speech 
crimes, it is worth pausing briefly to frame the overcriminalization of 
speech argument within a broader context. Overcriminalization of 
speech is principally one facet of a general problem concerning the 
excessive use of criminal statutes, commonly referred to as 
“overcriminalization.”59 Coining this term, Sanford Kadish noted that 
criminal statutes often encompass conduct that is not the target of 
 
 52 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 161. 
 53 See Slobogin, supra note 33, at 62 (noting the breadth of preventive laws). 
 54 See, e.g., Duff, supra note 34, at 43–62 (proposing limits on the scope of endangerment 
crimes). 
 55 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 159–77 (discussing limits to curb overcriminalization). 
 56 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 869–73 (2011) (discussing the absence of empirical evidence to establish 
the link between risk and harm). 
 57 See infra Part I.A–C. 
 58 See infra Part III. 
 59 See Luna, supra note 10, at 712–17; see also HUSAK, supra note 9, at 3–5. 
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legislative concern.60 Kadish broadly defined overcriminalization as the 
use of the criminal law to pursue public policy objectives for which it is 
poorly suited.61 In recent years, criminal law scholars have vehemently 
criticized the continual expansion of substantive criminal law, warning 
against the costs and burdens incurred by the criminal justice system, as 
well as against the dangers this expansion poses to individual 
defendants.62 They argue that there are too many broadly worded 
criminal statutes, covering a wide range of behaviors that do not justify 
the use of the resources of criminal enforcement.63 Erik Luna, for 
example, summarizes “the overcriminalization phenomenon,” which 
consists of untenable offenses, superfluous statutes, doctrines that 
overextend culpability crimes without jurisdictional authority, grossly 
disproportionate punishments, and excessive or pretextual enforcement 
of petty violations.64 
With this background in mind, this Article turns to its main 
contribution concerning the specific problem of the overcriminalization 
of speech. The subparts below identify concrete manifestations of this 
phenomenon by considering prominent examples of endangerment 
speech crimes. These statutes fall under three categories, tracking the 
classification of general endangerment (nonspeech) crimes, and include 
inchoate crimes, independent endangerment crimes, and possession 
crimes. 
A.     Inchoate Crimes 
Inchoate offenses, such as conspiracies and attempts, provide a 
prime example of how much speech is currently overcriminalized. 
1.     Conspiracy 
a.     Terrorism 
Recent years have seen a significant increase in preventive criminal 
statutes prohibiting speech associated with terrorism. Criminalization of 
terrorism-related behaviors is facilitated through two factors: first, the 
expansion of the scope of traditional conspiracy doctrines and second, 
 
 60 See Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962). 
 61 See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 157 (1967). 
 62 See Luna, supra note 10, at 703–04, 725–29 (describing overcriminalization and its costs). 
 63 See Stuntz, supra note 10, at 507 (noting the broad range of crimes, including trivial ones). 
 64 See Luna, supra note 10, at 717 (summarizing the main features of overcriminalization). 
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the broad coverage of the prohibition against providing material 
support to foreign terrorist organizations (FTO). 
The continual threats of terrorism have led the federal government 
and the states to create numerous endangerment crimes targeted 
towards reducing the risks that may emanate from behaviors believed to 
be related to the activities of terrorist organizations.65 Following 9/11, 
the government placed a premium on early detection and prevention by 
vigorously prosecuting suspects whose conduct was perceived as posing 
threats to national security.66 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–B make it a crime to 
knowingly provide material support to any designated FTO, with the 
phrase “material support” broadly defined to include “training,” “expert 
advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel.”67 Bringing criminal 
charges under this statute has become the main tool used by the 
government in exercising preemptive measures against those suspected 
of connections to terrorism.68 
Various types of provision of services and expert advice or 
assistance are often grounded in speech and expression, thus arguably 
meeting the “support” requirement enumerated in § 2339B. For 
instance, a publication that praises terrorism would be perceived as one 
form of support for a terrorist organization. As the discussion below 
illustrates, the broadly worded statute provides the government with 
expansive powers to prosecute individuals for expressing a host of 
political viewpoints, when it suspects that the expressive messages 
conveyed by the speech increase the chances that these messages would 
persuade others to engage in terrorism. 
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the criminal prohibition on advocacy performed in 
coordination with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organization 
was not unconstitutional as applied to the particular activities stated by 
the plaintiffs.69 More specifically, the Court held that the plaintiffs were 
prohibited from providing legal support to PKK (a designated FTO on 
how to follow and implement humanitarian and international law), 
even when that support consisted of peaceful resolutions of disputes and 
the petitioning of various international bodies.70 The Court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ vagueness claim, finding that the plaintiffs’ specific conduct 
squarely fell within the scope of the terms “training” and “expert advice 
 
 65 See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of 
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 456–58 (2007) (discussing the scope of liability for 
terrorism conspiracies). 
 66 Id. at 429–32 (describing the government’s policy concerning early prevention). 
 67 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–B (2012). 
 68 See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of 
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26–30 (2005). 
 69 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 22–24 (2010). 
 70 Id. at 29–31, 35–39. 
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or assistances” required by the statute. As for the claim that the statute 
violates the First Amendment, the Court acknowledged that the statute 
limits the scope of free speech, but nonetheless held that it was a 
permissible preventive measure that criminalizes aid that makes 
terrorist attacks more likely to occur.71 
Cognizant of the fact that the above statute adopts a content-based 
prohibition on speech, the HLP decision purports to draw on two 
important distinctions demarcating the legal boundary between 
protected and prohibited speech. The first distinguishes between mere 
membership and actual support of the organization by implying that 
joining a terrorist organization is a constitutionally protected activity, 
while engaging in speech that aids that organization may be 
criminalized.72 The second distinction rests on the purported difference 
between independent advocacy of terrorism, which is constitutionally 
protected under the First Amendment, and concerted activity 
amounting to provision of service to the FTO, in coordination with or 
at the direction of this organization, which is criminalized.73 Prohibiting 
the latter is justified, reasoned the Court, because the probability of a 
terrorist attack increases due to receiving support.74 It is crucial to note, 
however, that the HLP holding does not require a substantial probability 
that the speech would result in tangible harm. Any slight increase in the 
probability of harm, regardless of its actual likelihood, suffices to uphold 
criminalization. 
The prohibition against providing material support criminalizes 
not only the provision of support to FTOs but also conspiring to do so.75 
A significant component in the government’s use of preventive statutes 
includes bringing criminal charges for conspiring to provide material 
support to FTOs.76 The above statutory language provides an important 
measure for the government to broaden the scope of conspiracy law in 
order to curb what it perceives as potential risks of future terrorism. 
Notably, these conspiracy charges are based solely on the defendants’ 
engagement in various forms of speech. 
Examples of the government’s use of conspiracy doctrine to 
criminalize different types of endangerment speech fall under two 
categories, the first involving prosecutions against Muslim religious 
leaders whose teachings are perceived as advocating terrorism, and the 
second involving prosecutions of individuals who operate, post 
 
 71 Id. at 35–36. 
 72 Id. at 39–40. 
 73 Id. at 23–24. 
 74 Id. at 4–5. 
 75 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012). 
 76 See Chesney, supra note 65, at 456 (discussing liability for terrorism conspiracies). 
BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL.36.5.2 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:27 PM 
1682 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:1667 
 
messages, or otherwise contribute to various Islamic websites suspected 
of connections with terrorist organizations.77 
The prosecution of Omar Abdel Rahman provides a salient 
example of the first category of cases.78 Rahman, a Muslim religious 
figure (Sheik), was charged with seditious conspiracy and solicitation 
based on the government’s theory that he was the leader of the terrorist 
network that plotted to bomb the World Trade Center in 1993.79 The 
government presented evidence that Rahman dispensed religious 
opinions (fatwas) on the holiness of terrorist acts, instructing his 
supporters to “do jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with the 
grenades, with the missile . . . against God’s enemies.”80 This speech, 
argued the government, amounted to conspiracy to commit crimes of 
terrorism. A jury convicted him on all counts, and he was sentenced to 
life in prison.81 On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected Rahman’s 
argument that his conviction violated the First Amendment.82 The court 
held that criminal conspiracies were not protected simply because they 
were formed through words.83 While the Second Circuit treated the case 
as one involving conspiracy, much of the evidence it relied upon to 
prove this conspiracy consisted of the defendant’s advocacy of 
terrorism.84 The Rahman case thus illustrates the blurred line between 
advocacy of crime—which is generally protected under the Brandenburg 
test—in the absence of high likelihood and imminence of harm, and 
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, which is criminalized. 
The case mentioned in the Introduction, United States v. Mehanna, 
is illustrative of the second category of cases concerning criminal 
charges against individuals who advocate terrorism on Islamic 
websites.85 Mehanna’s conviction of conspiring to provide material 
support to al-Qaeda rested on two separate clusters of activities: one 
related to a trip he made to Yemen, allegedly to join an al-Qaeda 
training camp, which he failed to find; the other was speech-based, 
namely, his translation of al-Qaeda’s propaganda materials from Arabic 
into English, which he posted on a jihadist website.86 Since this Article’s 
main thesis concerns the overcriminalization of speech, the analysis 
below focuses solely on the latter grounds for conviction. 
 
 77 United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Al-Hussayen, 
No. CR03-048-C-EJL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29793 (D. Idaho Apr. 6, 2004). 
 78 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 79 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (2012); see also Rahman, 189 F.3d 88. 
 80 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 104 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81 Id. at 111. 
 82 Id. at 114–18. 
 83 Id. at 115. 
 84 See Healy, supra note 51, at 670–71. 
 85 See United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 86 Id. 
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The government alleged that Mehanna’s translations constituted 
“material support” in the form of a “service” to a terrorist organization 
because they aided al-Qaeda by spreading its messages and by 
facilitating recruitment of followers who would pursue terrorist 
endeavors.87 The government further alleged that Mehanna agreed with 
others to provide material support to al-Qaeda and that he committed 
several overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy, including watching 
jihadi videos, discussing efforts to create like-minded youth in the 
Boston area, and discussing attending a terrorist camp.88 Mehanna 
denied having any direct connection with al-Qaeda, insisting that the 
government was required to establish such connection.89 The jury 
accepted the government’s theory and convicted Mehanna, among 
others, based on the translated materials.90 Mehanna appealed his 
conviction, arguing, in part, that the district court committed legal 
errors in charging the jury with respect to the translations.91 
Writing for the court, Judge Selya rejected Mehanna’s argument 
that the translations merely amounted to independent advocacy, which 
the HLP Court held was constitutionally protected speech.92 The court 
reiterated HLP’s holding that advocacy performed in coordination with 
or at the direction of an FTO is not shielded by the First Amendment.93 
Dismissing Mehanna’s claim that the jury instructions failed to define 
the term “coordination,” the court held that the district court defined 
the term functionally by explaining to the jury that independent 
advocacy for either an FTO or an FTO’s goals does not amount to 
coordination. The court further stressed that the government’s theory 
rested on the premise that the translations are one type of “service” and 
thus amount to provision of material support, which the statute 
prohibits.94 Therefore, the court held that the jury instructions 
embraced the legal construct adopted by the court’s holding in HLP that 
“service,” as material support, “refers to concerted activity, not 
independent advocacy,” and thus is not “shielded by the First 
Amendment.”95 The court further clarified that neither the statute itself 
nor the Court’s decision in HLP require that the person providing the 
 
 87 Id. at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88 Id. at 44–46. 
 89 Id. at 46, 50. 
 90 Id. at 42. 
 91 Id. at 48 (noting that the defendant argued that the jury’s instructions were erroneous in 
three respects: they “(i) fail[ed] to define the term ‘coordination’; (ii) [they] incorrectly direct[ed] 
the jury not to consider the First Amendment; and (iii) [they] should have been replaced by a set 
of instructions that [the defendant] unsuccessfully proffered to the district court”).  
 92 Id. at 49. 
 93 Id. (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 24 (2010)). 
 94 Id. at 49. 
 95 Id. (citing Holder, 561 U.S. at  23–24). 
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alleged support to an FTO have a direct connection to the FTO.96 
Addressing Mehanna’s claim that the jury’s finding of “coordination” 
with an FTO lacked sufficient supporting evidence, the court further 
held that even if that proof was factually insufficient, the conviction was 
independently supported based on the government’s Yemen trip theory, 
for which the government presented mass evidence.97 
Cognizant of the difficulties that the government’s “translation as 
service” theory posed for First Amendment jurisprudence, the court 
attempted to play down the significance of the translation-centric 
charge by characterizing it only as an “alternative basis” for 
conviction.98 But while Mehanna’s trip to Yemen figured more 
prominently in the decision, nowhere did the court reject the 
government’s unprecedented theory that mere translation of materials 
already publicly available on the Internet amounts to provision of 
service to al-Qaeda. The court accepted the government’s expansive 
position, even though it neither provided evidence that Mehanna ever 
met or communicated with anyone from al-Qaeda, nor demonstrated 
that the translation was sent to this organization.99 
The Mehanna decision is deeply troubling for several reasons. 
First, it demonstrates how the prohibition against providing material 
support to FTOs criminalizes a lot of speech, despite the arguably weak 
causal link between the speech in question and the risk of future harm. 
As the Court has long noted, the Constitution is not a suicide pact, and 
defendants’ right to free speech should be outweighed by clear risks 
emanating from dangerous speech, provided that such risks are indeed 
established.100 However, the evidence in the Mehanna case fell short of 
demonstrating high likelihood of substantial harm to national security. 
Instead, criminalization of speech was upheld there based on mere risk 
that the translations would support al-Qaeda by inciting others to 
commit terrorist acts. Furthermore, existing literature offers little 
evidence of a correlation between religiously based speech or particular 
religious ideologies and terrorism.101 Convicting individuals for 
disseminating speech that merely praises an ideology, including a 
violent and repugnant one, rather than explicitly calling for commission 
of terrorist acts, is especially disconcerting because such speech reflects 
 
 96 Id. at 50. 
 97 Id. at 51. 
 98 Id. at 50. 
 99 See David Cole, 39 Ways to Limit Free Speech, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Apr. 19, 2012, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/apr/19/39-ways-limit-free-speech. 
 100 Cf. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that individual constitutional rights may be encroached when significant risks are 
identified). 
 101 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 833, 876–80, 900 (2011). 
BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL.36.5.2 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:27 PM 
2015] OVERCRIMINALIZING S PEEC H  1685 
 
mere aspirations rather than concrete operational plans. The assumed 
dangers stemming from glorifying terrorist acts have yet to be verified 
empirically. 
Second, the decision undermines existing First Amendment 
jurisprudence by expanding government’s authority to suppress 
political expression and association in the name of perceived threats to 
national security, creating a “chilling” effect on political dissent.102 
Mehanna’s ideological support for al-Qaeda undoubtedly expresses 
extremist viewpoints that are rightly perceived by the vast majority of 
Americans as abhorrent. Judge Richard Posner, for example, contends 
that speech that supports terrorism does not warrant constitutional 
protection because such messages do not comport with Western 
democratic values.103 In contrast, this Article argues that it is precisely 
that type of abominable messages that are the paradigm example of 
political speech warranting constitutional protection as long as they fall 
short of establishing high likelihood of harm. The strength of the First 
Amendment and a democratic regime’s tolerance towards dissenting 
opinions are best measured when considering these appalling cases. 
Third, and most importantly, a fundamental concern raised by the 
Mehanna decision is the surprising interplay between general criminal 
law and First Amendment law. As noted earlier, speech that incites 
others to violence is generally protected under Brandenburg’s stringent 
test. Prior to 9/11, Mehanna could not have been convicted for advocacy 
of terrorism even if he had written the inciting materials himself, unless 
the government could demonstrate the high likelihood and immanency 
requirements, a standard virtually impossible to meet for written 
texts.104 Arguably, prosecutions of individuals based on their advocacy 
of terrorism directly clashes with Brandenburg.105 Under Brandenburg, 
the First Amendment should have protected Mehanna’s expression of 
abstract views supporting violence by someone acting independently of 
an FTO, even when those views coincide with those of the terrorist 
organization. 
Nevertheless, by taking the indirect path of criminalizing 
conspiracy to provide material support to an FTO, the criminal law 
enables the government to accomplish precisely the same result that the 
First Amendment squarely prohibits.106 Although under federal law 
 
 102 Cf. David Cole, Essay, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 147–50 
(2012) (noting that the HLP decision creates a chilling effect on legitimate political speech). 
 103 See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 120–25 (2006). 
 104 See Cole, supra note 99. 
 105 See Healy, supra note 51, at 680. 
 106 See Daphne Barak-Erez & David Scharia, Freedom of Speech, Support for Terrorism, and the 
Challenge of Global Constitutional Law, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 1, 28 (2011). 
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there is no statute directly criminalizing incitement to terrorism, 
substantive criminal law—via its generous conspiracy doctrines—
provides the government with ample measures to limit the spread of 
allegedly terrorist messages. Importantly, unlike First Amendment 
jurisprudence, requiring high likelihood of harm, conspiracy law 
criminalizes speech without requiring any nexus between the expressive 
messages and actual harm. Conspiracy law, thus, functions as an 
effective means for the government to bypass First Amendment 
jurisprudence’s strict requirements for prohibiting advocacy of violence, 
resulting in a direct collision between these two areas of law.107 
Advocacy of crime (ostensibly including terrorism), which is 
constitutionally protected under free speech doctrines, becomes 
prohibited under conspiracy doctrine, with no constitutional 
constraints to limit criminalization. In practice, the upshot is that 
advocacy of crime is protected only as long as the crime at issue is not 
terrorism-related. 
The government’s use of the conspiracy to provide material 
support statute raises not only First Amendment concerns but also a 
host of other concerns from the perspective of substantive criminal 
law.108 First, these prosecutions expand criminal liability above and 
beyond traditional conspiracy doctrines to cover conduct of highly 
ambiguous nature.109 Commentators have long criticized conspiracy law 
in general as an unjustified expansion of criminal liability.110 Conspiracy 
liability in the terrorism context demonstrates even further enlargement 
of criminal liability because these prosecutions often do not square with 
conspiracy law’s main tenets: agreement, overt act, and intent. 
The agreement requirement, which is the actus reus of the terrorist 
conspiracy and the cornerstone of conspiracy liability is significantly 
eroded if the government is not required to establish any evidence that 
the defendants actually communicated with a terrorist organization.111 
In a typical conspiracy prosecution, the agreement may be proven 
circumstantially through concerted action toward a common 
purpose.112 But even this minimal requirement becomes diffused in 
terrorism-related prosecutions, resulting in banning behaviors falling 
short of concrete agreements to cooperate with others in the 
commission of crimes.113 The nature of the agreement between the 
 
 107 Id. at 29–30. 
 108 See Chesney, supra note 65, at 479–81, 492–93; see also NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-
TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 57–62 (4th ed. 2011). 
 109 See Chesney, supra note 65, at 474. 
 110 See Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 413–
14 (1959). 
 111 See Cole, supra note 99. 
 112 See Chesney, supra note 65, at 448–56 (discussing the elements of conspiracy). 
 113 Id. at 473–74 (discussing the risks of expanding conspiracy liability). 
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alleged co-conspirators is often highly equivocal given that individuals 
are charged based on their ambiguous connections with unidentified 
groups without clear proof of the type of relationship between the co-
conspirators and the FTO.114 
The overt act requirement is also diluted as the prohibition against 
providing material support enables prosecution based merely on speech 
that is perceived as supporting terrorism, but falls short of overt acts in 
the commission of specified crimes. Conspiracy law’s mens rea of intent 
is similarly eroded when individuals are prosecuted for running Islamic 
websites and for dispensing religious opinions where the only proof of 
criminal intent is the content of their speech.115 No separate evidence is 
required to prove the defendants’ intent to agree with the terrorist 
organization to commit any crimes. Prosecution of terrorism-related 
conspiracies, thus, poses particular threats in casting too broad a net, 
creating a significant risk that protected speech will be used to prove 
nonexistent conspiracies.116 The upshot of expanding conspiracy 
liability is that criminalization is grounded on pre-inchoate liability, 
prohibiting the mere preparatory stages before liability under traditional 
conspiracy doctrines could have been attached.117 
Second, an additional concern stemming from criminal law theory 
rests with grounding criminal liability on associational conduct. Prior to 
the Court’s decision in HLP, associational conduct could be punished 
only when there was evidence that a defendant had specific intent 
regarding an organization’s specific criminal ends.118 Traditional 
complicity doctrines criminalize aiding and abetting acts that are 
directly linked to commission of specific crimes only.119 The Court’s 
decision in HLP significantly reduced constitutional protection against 
guilt by association by relying on a dubious distinction between mere 
membership in an organization and actual provision of support to the 
organization.120 This distinction, however, is notably weak, allowing the 
government to circumvent the prohibition against guilt by 
association.121 Under the material support statute criminal liability is 
grounded merely on an organization’s status as a terrorist group. 
Following HLP, any type of relationship between an individual and the 
 
 114 Id. at 492–93 (noting the risks of expanding conspiracy liability). 
 115 See United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 116 See Steven R. Morrison, Conspiracy Law’s Threat to Free Speech, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 865, 
886–87 (2013) (“[E]arlier law enforcement intervention also increases the risk that protected 
speech will be used to prove nonexistent conspiracies.”); id. at 917–19. 
 117 See Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Prevention and Criminalization: Justifications and 
Limits, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 542, 545 (2012). 
 118 See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966). 
 119 See Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from 
the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 5, 10–11 (2005). 
 120 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 29–33 (2010). 
 121 See Huq, supra note 101, at 891–93. 
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FTO would amount to provision of material support, without requiring 
the government to prove the perpetrator’s particular contribution to the 
FTO’s specified crimes. 
An initial intuition many readers may share is that speech is 
overcriminalized only in the limited context of national security, where 
terrorism’s grave threats should trump individuals’ speech rights while 
outside this specific area speech is broadly protected. This assumption, 
however, is false. The scholarly focus on the criminalization of 
terrorism-related speech overlooks the broader ramifications of 
overcriminalizing speech above and beyond the terrorism context. 
Legislatures’ general trend towards preventive law enforcement has also 
resulted in an increase in endangerment speech offenses in additional 
areas as the following subsections demonstrate. 
b.     Other Conspiracies Beyond Terrorism 
While the terrorism context presents its unique challenges, the 
government also uses broad conspiracy theories in situations that go 
above and beyond this distinct realm. Conspiracy charges brought in 
the case of United States v. Valle provide a prominent example in which 
conspiracy doctrine has been unjustifiably expanded based on 
speculative assessments of the defendant’s dangerousness.122 Defendant 
Gilberto Valle, a former New York Police Department police officer, 
was charged under federal law123 with conspiring with three other 
individuals to kidnap, rape, torture, kill, cook, and eat body parts of 
several identified women.124 The prosecution had argued that Valle had 
entered into an agreement with three alleged co-conspirators to commit 
the above crimes and that he had formed the specific intent to carry out 
the plan.125 To prove these allegations, the prosecution largely relied on 
emails and instant message “chats” that were found on his home 
computer.126 In these electronic communications, Valle discussed with 
his alleged co-conspirators the gruesome details of his plan.127 In 
addition, a search of Valle’s computer revealed that he created eighty-
nine computer folders containing the names and pictures of numerous 
women.128 Valle also accessed, without legal authorization, law 
 
 122 United States v. Valle, (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (overturning the jury’s conviction of the defendant). 
 123 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2012) (prohibiting conspiracy to commit kidnapping). In addition, 
Valle was also charged in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2012), for accessing without 
authorization law enforcement databases in order to obtain information about potential victims. 
Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 59. 
 124 Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 60. 
 125 Id. at 59. 
 126 Id. at 65–77 (detailing the content of the cyberspace communication between Valle and 
others). 
 127 Id. at 60. 
 128 Id. at 77. 
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enforcement databases in order to obtain the home addresses and places 
of business of these women.129 The evidence also showed that Valle had 
conducted Google searches for phrases like “how to abduct a girl” and 
“how to chloroform a girl.”130 While the government conceded at trial 
that the Internet communications between Valle and twenty-one other 
individuals were mere fantasy role play, it had argued that Valle’s 
communications with three alleged co-conspirators amounted to 
genuine conspiracy to actually kidnap women.131 
In response to the prosecution’s conspiracy theory, the defense 
stressed that Valle merely played out a fantasy of role playing on a fetish 
website, and that going through the motions of planning the alleged 
kidnapping was part of that fantasy.132 Valle communicated with his co-
conspirators, the argument continued, about a plan that he never meant 
to carry out in the real world.133 The defense emphasized that Valle 
neither followed through on any of the acts he was accused of discussing 
nor planned to do so and that the prosecution failed to establish that 
Valle had taken any overt acts to turn those fantasies into violent 
actions.134 
The main issue in this case was whether the evidence against Valle 
was sufficient so that a rational jury could have found that Valle and his 
alleged co-conspirators had entered into a genuine agreement to kidnap 
several identified women and had formed the specific intent to actually 
kidnap these women.135 The government had argued that it had proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the alleged conspiracy—
namely, an actual agreement between Valle and his alleged co-
conspirators and the overt acts in which he engaged to further this 
alleged agreement and bring it to fruition by laying out the groundwork 
for kidnapping, torturing, and killing the women he had singled out.136 
The defense argued that the government failed to meet that burden and 
that neither an agreement nor specific intent was formed.137 A New 
York jury agreed with the government’s theory, convicting Valle on all 
charges on March 12, 2013.138 
Valle appealed his conviction and on June 30, 2014, District Court 
Judge Paul G. Gardephe overturned his conviction on the kidnapping 
 
 129 Id. at 62–63. 
 130 Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 131 Id. at 60. The three alleged co-conspirators were Michael Van Hise, a New Jersey resident; 
Aly Khan, an Indian or Pakistani resident; and Christopher Collins, a British resident known to 
Valle as “Moody Blues.” Id. at 59. 
 132 Id. at 59–60. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 59. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 59–60, 62–63. 
 137 Id. at 83. 
 138 Id. 
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conspiracy charge.139 With respect to establishing the element of 
agreement between the alleged co-conspirators to carry out their 
criminal plan, the court found that the government failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Valle had indeed entered into a genuine 
agreement to kidnap women.140 The court held that “the evidentiary 
record is such that it is more likely than not the case that all of Valle’s 
Internet communications about kidnapping are fantasy role-play.”141 
The court observed that “[o]nce the lies and the fantastical elements are 
stripped away, what is left are deeply disturbing misogynistic chats and 
emails written by an individual obsessed with imagining women he 
knows suffering horrific sex-related pain, terror, and degradation.”142 
The court concluded that “[d]espite the highly disturbing nature of 
Valle’s deviant and depraved sexual interests, his chats and emails about 
these interests are not sufficient—standing alone—to make out the 
elements of conspiracy to commit kidnapping.”143 
With respect to proving the specific intent element, the court 
further held that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Valle had formed the requisite specific criminal intent to 
commit the kidnapping.144 The court pointed at ample facts that were 
indicative of Valle’s lack of intent, supporting the conclusion that Valle 
and his alleged co-conspirators understood that no actual kidnapping 
was going to take place; these included the following facts: Valle and his 
alleged co-conspirators had never undertaken any steps in the real 
world to carry out their cyberspace plan and had never kidnapped 
anyone neither on one of the set dates nor on a different date, the dates 
that were set to purportedly commit the crimes were repeatedly ignored 
without any explanation, the information regarding the victims that 
Valle provided his alleged co-conspirators with was false, and the 
communication with the alleged co-conspirators was substantially 
indistinguishable from the numerous chats that the government 
conceded were mere fantasy role play.145 
The Valle case best captures the legal difficulties in distinguishing 
between electronic communications in the “virtual world” and actual 
acts in the “real world.” The main point of contention in this case was 
whether there was an actual crossing of the line from fantasy to reality, 
from mere thoughts, speech, and cyberspace role playing to real-life 
 
 139 Id. at 62 (holding, however, that Valle’s conviction for exceeding “his authorized access to a 
federal database” shall be affirmed). 
 140 Id. at 61–62. 
 141 Id. at 104. 
 142 Id. at 61. 
 143 Id. at 61–62. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 60–61. 
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violent crimes.146 The jury accepted the prosecution’s theory that Valle 
had indeed crossed that line between engaging in mere speech in the 
realm of cyberspace and taking concrete steps in practice to materialize 
his sexual fantasies into horrific violent crimes.147 In finding Valle 
guilty, the jury was unable to overcome prejudices and biases that stem 
from the inflammatory nature of the evidence, which consisted of 
extremely graphic depictions of sexual violence. Convicting Valle, 
therefore, raised the danger that guilt determination was largely based 
on the jury’s disgust and revulsion concerning Valle’s unusual sexual 
fantasies.148 The court, however, rejected such an expansive reading of 
the conspiracy statute, stressing that the alleged conspiracy exclusively 
took place in cyberspace, in a context in which even the government 
conceded that Valle had engaged in countless similar fantasy role plays 
with other individuals.149 Given the evidence, the prosecution failed to 
prove that Valle’s cyberspace speech had transformed into a criminal 
agreement, accompanied by a specific intent, to commit kidnapping and 
murder of women.150 The decision further demonstrates the difficulties 
in drawing the boundary between speech that merely raises a 
generalized and unquantifiable risk of potential future harm on one 
hand and dangerous behavior leading to actual harm on the other. The 
decision also demonstrates the risks of convicting defendants based not 
on the evidence itself but rather on emotions such as deep fear, as well 
as on the “ick factor.” 
Moreover, implied in Valle’s acquittal are also free speech 
arguments establishing the defense’s theory that the case merely 
involved sexual fantasies and role play rather than actual criminal 
actions.151 In essence, the defense’s primary contention was that the 
government could not punish the defendant for engaging in “ugly 
thoughts,” which are a form of protected speech under the First 
Amendment.152 The decision to prosecute Valle was, therefore, 
problematic not only from the substantive criminal law’s perspective 
but also from a free speech perspective. Had the court accepted the 
prosecution’s unprecedented expansion of conspiracy doctrine, the 
decision would have facilitated a flood of conspiracy charges based on 
 
 146 Id. at 61. 
 147 Id. at 59, 61. 
 148 Id. at 103–10 (addressing the steps taken by the court to avoid the risk that the jury would 
be prejudiced against the defendant). 
 149 Id. at 61. 
 150 Id. at 102. 
 151 See Benjamin Weiser, ‘Ugly Thoughts’ Defense Fails; Officer Guilty in Cannibal Plot, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, at A1 (noting that the defense described the charges against Valle as a 
“‘thought prosecution’”). 
 152 Id. (providing the statement of Valle’s attorney that the conviction cannot stand, because it 
is based on prosecuting Valle’s ugly thoughts). 
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speech from cyberspace communication that falls short of either 
genuine agreements to commit a crime or specific intent to do so. 
2.     Attempt 
Another facet of the overcriminalization of speech problem 
concerns the expansion of traditional attempt doctrines. Attempt 
doctrine embodies an important constraint under which the 
prosecution is required to establish that the defendant engaged in 
conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the 
crime.153 Some criminal statutes, however, adopt a sweeping position, 
obscuring the crucial boundary between mere preparatory acts, which 
are not the proper subject of criminal liability, and attempts, which 
mark the point where criminal liability attaches.154 Under these statutes, 
criminal sanctions may be imposed at a much earlier stage to cover the 
pre-inchoate offense stage. This often results in criminalizing an actus 
reus that consists merely of ambiguous and equivocal speech, 
unaccompanied by any acts that establish the defendant’s 
dangerousness, as the following statute demonstrates. 
Sexual predators who lure minors into engaging in sexual acts have 
become a growing concern for the criminal justice system in light of the 
proliferation of cyberspace communication. Responding to these 
concerns, federal law adopted a criminal provision aimed at the early 
targeting of sexual predators by thwarting the threat that the 
communication between perpetrator and minor would materialize into 
sexual abuse of the minor. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) prohibits the following: 
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or 
foreign commerce . . . knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or 
coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to 
engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person 
can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be 
fined . . . and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.155 
The justification for law enforcement’s preemptive intervention to 
prevent sexual abuse of vulnerable minors is uncontested, as these 
heinous crimes warrant the most severe criminal punishment. The 
controversial issue, however, is how early in the course of 
communication between perpetrator and minor the law may intervene 
and what evidence suffices to demonstrate that the perpetrator has 
 
 153 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (Official Draft 1962) (defining attempt to require “a 
substantial step”). 
 154 See Ashworth & Zedner, supra note 117 (noting the expansion of liability to the pre-
inchoate stage). 
 155 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). 
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taken a substantial step towards commission of a sex crime.156 The 
circuit split concerning the proper scope of the above statute sharpens 
these questions, as the cases below demonstrate. 
In United States v. Rothenberg, the defendant was convicted of one 
count of attempting to induce or entice a minor to engage in illicit sex, 
and one count of possession of sexually explicit visual material 
involving minors.157 The first count was based on the defendant 
advising an adult male how to engage in sexual acts with his eleven-
year-old daughter.158 The basis for the second count came from the 
results of a warranted search of the defendant’s residence in connection 
with the first count, as the defendant’s seized computer revealed 
numerous sexually explicit images of minors.159 The Eleventh Circuit 
upheld the conviction, rejecting the defendant’s theory that “mere 
talk . . . unaccompanied by some other form of overt conduct cannot 
constitute a substantial step necessary [for] an attempt to commit an 
offense . . . .”160 The court further held that the statute does not require 
proof of direct communication with a minor, and that dealing with an 
adult intermediary for the purpose of attempting to entice a minor into 
having sex with the defendant or some third party is sufficient to satisfy 
the elements of the statute.161 
The Rothenberg court’s holding is troubling in several respects. 
First, it significantly expands existing attempt doctrines. The court 
adopts the government’s broad reading of the statute, upholding the 
criminalization of a sexually solicitous communication, without 
accompanying action.162 Moreover, the statute’s overbroad wording 
captures all types of sexual communication concerning minors, even 
when minors themselves are not a part of the communication, which 
takes place between consenting adults.163 Under this approach, sexual 
communication about a minor in itself constitutes a substantial step 
toward commission of the target offense.164 
Furthermore, the court holds that mere sexual speech—without 
evidence demonstrating either the likelihood of harm to a minor or the 
 
 156 United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that prosecution 
requires an unmistakable proposal to engage in sex with a minor and that mere “explicit sex talk” 
is insufficient). 
 157 United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 623 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 158 Id. at 624. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 626. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 627. 
 163 Id. at 626 (“[T]o prove an attempted exploitation offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), the 
Government does not have to prove the existence or identity of a specific minor victim; a 
fictitious minor will suffice so long as the defendant understood and believed that a minor was 
involved.”). 
 164 Id. at 627. 
BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL.36.5.2 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:27 PM 
1694 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:1667 
 
perpetrator’s dangerousness—amounts to a substantial step towards 
committing the target offense.165 In holding so, the court virtually 
obliterates attempt doctrine’s substantial step requirement, which is 
designed to ensure that a defendant had crossed the boundary between 
harmless speech and dangerous action. Instead, criminal liability is 
expanded here to include the preparatory stages that an offender 
engages in before taking any substantial step. The upshot is that an actor 
who has not yet committed himself to having sex with a minor would be 
criminally liable based merely on sexually based speech. 
Second, one of the unintended consequences of an expansive 
reading of the statute at issue concerns criminalizing improper thoughts 
rather than dangerous acts. Imposing criminal liability based solely on 
verbal discussion of abstract ideas obfuscates the core distinction 
between actions and thoughts that is one of the fundamental tenets of 
the criminal law.166 Playing out sexual fantasies over the Internet does 
not rise to the level of taking a substantial step toward having sex with a 
minor. Moreover, grounding criminal liability based on some 
unquantifiable risk that the speech may lead to sexual abuse is an 
unjustified expansion of the criminal law. Criminalizing risk-creation 
behavior is warranted only when there is substantial probability that the 
sexual speech would lead to dangerous action. 
In contrast with the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, the Seventh 
Circuit rejects a governmental attempt to interpret the statute at issue 
expansively, refusing to impose criminal sanction on speech falling 
short of dangerous conduct. In United States v. Gladish, a thirty-five-
year-old man was caught in a sting operation in which a government 
agent impersonated a fourteen-year-old girl in an Internet chat room.167 
Gladish visited the chat room, attempting to solicit “Abagail” to have 
sex with him.168 In a typical prosecution based on such an operation, the 
defendant, after obtaining consent, goes to meet his party and is 
arrested upon his arrival.169 However, Gladish was arrested before 
making any concrete travel plans.170 
Reversing Gladish’s conviction, Judge Posner used harsh words to 
express his dissatisfaction with the government’s decision to prosecute 
the case.171 Posner rejected the prosecution’s theory that Gladish’s 
 
 165 Id. 
 166 See Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437, 2443–44 
(2007) (discussing the act requirement’s role in criminal law). 
 167 United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. (“[‘Abagail’] agreed to have sex with the defendant and in a subsequent chat he 
discussed the possibility of traveling to meet her in a couple of weeks, but no arrangements were 
made. He was then arrested.”). 
 171 Id. at 650–51. 
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behavior satisfied the elements of the offense of attempting to entice a 
minor, noting that the charges were based only on Gladish’s cyberspace 
communication with “Abagail,” without any indication of his intention 
to meet or have sex with her.172 Posner noted that Gladish might have 
believed he was playing out a fantasy, which is common in Internet 
relationships.173 Posner further stressed that “[t]reating speech (even 
obscene speech) as the ‘substantial step’ would abolish any requirement 
of a substantial step.”174 Instead, added Posner, the defendant must take 
some specific actions beyond speech, such as agreeing on a time and 
place for the meeting, making a hotel reservation, or buying a bus or 
train ticket, none of which were taken by Gladish.175 Posner noted that 
the defendant’s dangerousness is the main purpose behind punishing 
attempts, and that the substantial step requirement demonstrates it, 
marking the perpetrator as genuinely dangerous, “a doer and not just 
one of the ‘hollow men’ of T.S. Eliot’s poem, incapacitated from 
action . . . .”176 
The above circuit split stems from a doctrinal disagreement about 
the nature of the complete crime of enticing a minor to engage in illicit 
sex. Judge Posner’s reading implies that in order for the enticement 
offense to be complete, the government must prove that the defendant 
actually had sex with the minor.177 In contrast, Judge Hodge’s reading in 
Rothenberg implies that the actus reus of the complete offense consists 
merely of the successful verbal persuasion of a minor, which is in itself 
an inchoate speech-based crime. Under the latter position, the victim’s 
state of mind—assent—constitutes the complete enticement, rather than 
the sex act itself, therefore, enabling the government to prosecute 
attempts at an earlier point in time, based on speech alone. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has not yet resolved the circuit split concerning the 
scope of the above statute. 
B.     Anticipatory/Independent Endangerment Crimes 
Risk-creation speech crimes consist not only of inchoate crimes 
but also of independent endangerment offenses that separately 
criminalize as a complete crime the creation of a risk of future injury. 
Criminal responsibility under the endangerment rationale holds that 
one is responsible for endangering another if one’s conduct creates a 
significant risk of harming that person, even if no harm results from the 
 
 172 Id. at 649. 
 173 Id. at 650. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 649. 
 176 Id. at 648. 
 177 Id. at 649. 
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endangerment.178 Numerous criminal statutes prohibit risk-creating 
behaviors, including reckless endangerment, reckless driving, and 
driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol.179 A significant portion 
of endangerment crimes involves prohibitions on expression, providing 
yet another illustration of the proliferation of speech crimes. The 
following subsections elaborate on two notable examples of excessive 
criminalization of endangerment speech. 
1.     Verbal Harassment 
Many jurisdictions have adopted a wide array of criminal statutes 
expansively prohibiting various forms of harassment.180 Commentators 
note that the term “harassment” has no unified legal definition and that 
it covers different types of undefined misconducts, ranging from 
stalking and cyberstalking (physically or virtually) that is following or 
conducting surveillance of another individual, causing her fear for her 
safety, to threats to a person or property, fighting words, or profanity.181 
Moreover, many criminal statutes fail to accurately define what 
misbehaviors are encompassed in the term “harassment” by including a 
residual subsection, which prohibits engaging in “any other course of 
alarming conduct serving no legitimate purpose of the actor” if it is 
done with purpose to harass another.182 A comprehensive analysis of 
harassment statutes and the challenges they present to both free speech 
and criminal law doctrines exceeds the scope of this Article.183 The 
following discussion is, therefore, limited to one specific example of 
 
 178 See Michelle Madden Dempsey, Sex Trafficking and Criminalization: In Defense of Feminist 
Abolitionism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1762–63 (2010) (discussing the endangerment 
justification). 
 179 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2705 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-103 
(2013). 
 180 These statutes are typically modeled after the MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 (1980), which 
prohibits the following: 
A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass another, he: (1) 
makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate communication; or (2) insults, 
taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly 
response; or (3) makes repeated communications anonymously or at extremely 
inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language; or (4) subjects another to an 
offensive touching; or (5) engages in any other course of alarming conduct serving no 
legitimate purpose of the actor. 
 181 See Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 790–
92, 810–11 (2013) (discussing the scope of criminal harassment statutes). 
 182 Id. at 791–92 (noting that the drafters of the Model Penal Code enacted the residual 
prohibition, preferring a vague and broader law rather than leaving unforeseen actions to go 
unpunished). 
 183 For discussion of these harassment statutes, see generally Caplan, supra note 181 and 
Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and 
“Cyberstalking,” 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731 (2013). 
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verbal harassment, often dubbed bullying in layman’s terms, which has 
lately become the target of legislatures and courts. In particular, this 
discussion excludes criminal statutes against cyberstalking and threats 
often communicated in cyberspace, which are typically covered by 
existing criminal statutes.184 The latter inflict severe forms of emotional 
and psychological harm and are beyond the scope of my critique here.185 
While the term “bullying” covers both traditional face-to-face 
verbal harassment and cyberspace harassment, the discussion below 
specifically aims at cyberbullying as a prominent facet of the broader 
trend towards criminalizing speech-based harassment. The term 
“cyberbullying” does not have an acceptable legal definition and it 
encompasses a broad spectrum of speech disseminated via electronic 
communication, ranging from threatening and harassing to annoying, 
offending, gossiping, and name calling.186 Given the absence of a legal 
definition, this Article uses the term cyberharassment instead. In recent 
years, the growing use of cyberspace communication to verbally harass 
others has led to a host of legislative measures aimed at curbing the 
problem of cyberharassment.187 While the vast majority of states have 
adopted civil measures, predominantly focusing on the liability of 
schools for students’ bullying, several states have also criminalized 
verbal harassment, explicitly clarifying that it includes 
cyberharassment.188 These jurisdictions have expanded their existing 
criminal harassment laws above and beyond explicit threats of violence, 
stalking, and traditional telephone harassment to also include various 
acts of cybercommunication over a period of time, directed at a specific 
person, that seriously alarm that person and would cause a reasonable 
person to suffer substantial emotional distress.189 
Massachusetts provides a prominent example for a state that 
passed such a law, with its “Criminal Harassment” statute proscribing 
the following: 
 
 184 For a comprehensive discussion of these criminal prohibitions, see generally DANIELLE 
KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014). 
 185 See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 345, 361–74 (2014) (advocating the expansion of criminal sanctions to cover 
cyberstalking and intentional infliction of harm); see also Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, A 
New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 
125–35 (2007). 
 186 See Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. 
L. REV. 693, 718 (2012) (noting various forms of verbal harassment). 
 187 See Volokh, supra note 183, at 741–42 (noting that most courts have upheld these laws); see 
also Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 186, at 695–96. 
 188 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a) (2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 
2014), invalidated by People v. Golb, 15 N.E.3d 805 (N.Y. 2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2709(a) (West 2013). 
 189 See Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 186, at 700 (discussing various types of criminal 
cyberharassment statutes). 
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(a) Whoever willfully and maliciously engages in a knowing pattern 
of conduct or series of acts over a period of time directed at a 
specific person, which seriously alarms that person and would 
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, 
shall be guilty of the crime of criminal harassment . . . . The 
conduct or acts described in this paragraph shall 
include . . . electronic mail, internet communications, instant 
messages or facsimile communications.190 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet examined the constitutionality 
of any specialized criminal harassment statute. Commentators have 
begun to criticize these statutes largely from the perspective of the First 
Amendment.191 However, criminal cyberharassment laws raise not only 
free speech concerns but also insurmountable problems stemming from 
substantive criminal law. First, these statutes are at odds with basic 
tenets of the criminal law because they are typically overbroad and 
vague. The statute adopted by the Massachusetts legislature criminalizes 
a host of behaviors that are not specifically defined, potentially raising a 
lack of fair notice problem. Grounding criminal liability on ambiguous 
phrases, such as “conduct which seriously alarms” is particularly 
problematic since it is unclear of what the actus reus of the crime 
consists. Moreover, the phrase “alarm a person” is notably overbroad, 
covering a wide range of speech that ought to be constitutionally 
protected. Such indeterminate language introduces a dangerous degree 
of uncertainty into criminal prohibitions, which ought to be clear and 
definite. Furthermore, this term is so broad that determining its precise 
scope also raises significant vagueness concerns.192 Grounding criminal 
liability on such equivocal notions limits individuals’ freedom of action, 
resulting in a “chilling effect” that may cause them to abstain from 
engaging in a host of permissible behaviors. 
Second, criminal sanctions are not best suited to address the 
complexities of cyberharassment and to curb its harms. Combating 
cyberharassment requires changing prevailing social norms through the 
education of teenagers about its injuries. Criminal law, however, is often 
ineffective in fostering social change, being an inadequate means for 
solving social problems.193 While incarcerating teenagers for 
cyberharassment sends an expressive societal message, there are less 
drastic measures for conveying society’s condemnation of the 
 
 190 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a) (2013). 
 191 See Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 186, at 698 (contending that criminal cyberharassment 
laws are prone to overreaching, suppressing protected speech). 
 192 See Caplan, supra note 181, at 810–11 (discussing the vagueness of verbal harassment 
statutes). 
 193 See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581 (2009) 
(discussing the shortcomings of criminal sanctions in fostering social change). 
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phenomenon. Criminal sanctions are not suitable for accomplishing 
such goals.194 
Criminalization is also problematic in light of the view that 
prohibiting cyberharassment is justified, among others, as yet another 
example of a risk-creation crime. Put differently, criminal statutes 
against verbal harassment offer another salient example of 
endangerment speech crimes. Characterizing cyberharassment as one 
type of a prophylactic measure, aimed to prevent harm before it is 
inflicted, warrants some further exploration, since it is a somewhat 
novel idea, and has not been explored yet in existing legal literature. 
Cyberharassment is typically viewed as a complete offense, inflicting 
severe emotional harm on tormented individuals at the moment it is 
committed. Ample studies suggest that cyberharassment causes serious 
psychological trauma on young victims, ostensibly justifying the use of 
various legal remedies.195 However, the view that one type of harm 
stemming from cyberharassment is the infliction of emotional distress 
does not preclude the dual nature of the prohibition, and the 
multifaceted understanding of the harms it targets. Viewed this way, the 
criminal prohibition against cyberharassment may also be perceived as 
one type of an endangerment offense. In other words, cyberharassment 
is not only a complete offense but also is an inchoate crime that aims to 
provide a prophylactic measure against the potential future risk of 
young victims committing suicide. The criminal prohibition, thus, 
targets not only the separate harm of infliction of emotional distress but 
also the additional future danger that the devastating emotional effects 
of the tormenting speech may lead victims to take their own lives. 
Several reasons support the assertion that extending criminal 
prohibitions on verbal harassment to include expanded forms of 
cyberharassment statutes serves as yet another prophylactic measure 
aimed at protecting minors from the risk of self-inflicted death. The first 
lies with considering legislatures’ intents and motives in enacting these 
prohibitions. A number of studies suggest that cyberharassment has 
contributed to the suicides of many teenagers.196 Some notable examples 
include Phoebe Prince of Massachusetts, Megan Meier of Missouri, and 
Tyler Clementi of New Jersey.197 In response to several high-publicized 
ostensibly bullying-related suicides, legislatures have adopted 
 
 194 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 385, 437 
(2012) (explaining why criminal anti-bullying statutes are unjustified). 
 195 See SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR., 
CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, & RESPONSE (2014), available at 
http://cyberbullying.us/Cyberbullying_Identification_Prevention_Response.pdf. 
 196  See Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 186, at 694 & nn.6 & 10. 
 197 See Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A 
Model Cyberbullying Policy that Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth Amendment 
Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 645–47 (2011). 
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excessively severe measures in an attempt to appear “tough on 
bullying.”198 The Massachusetts experience is illustrative. Phoebe Prince, 
a Massachusetts fifteen-year-old girl, was subject to relentless taunts and 
verbal assaults from fellow students at her high school, before she 
hanged herself.199 Prince’s suicide received national attention, creating a 
media buzz and a major public uproar attributing the suicide to the 
torturous bullying.200 Shortly thereafter, Massachusetts adopted the 
above specialized criminal harassment statute, designed to target the 
perceived risk of suicide.201 Criminal statutes against cyberharassment, 
thus, rest on the assumption that there is a direct connection between 
teenagers’ suicides and cyberharassment, and that criminalization 
provides a preventive measure aimed at reducing the risks associated 
with bullying’s fatal effects.202 
Second, considering the prevailing discourse around civil 
harassment statutes suggests that the prophylactic value of these statutes 
is a particularly dominant theme when civil harassment orders are 
concerned.203 Commentators note, for example, that the core of civil 
harassment statutes should focus on protecting victims’ safety and 
privacy.204 But the notion of promoting victim’s safety underlies not 
only civil harassment statutes but also criminal ones. Indeed, one of the 
main purposes of criminal law is to promote individuals’ safety and 
security and protect them against potential future harm, thus 
supporting the claim that the endangerment rationale also plays an 
important role in criminal statutes against cyberharassment. Finally, 
comparing criminal prohibitions against cyberharassment to civil 
regulation of discrimination-based harassment further buttresses the 
argument that the criminal prohibition aims at a prophylactic measure. 
The harms inflicted on victims of sexual harassment may be equally 
devastating to those inflicted by cyberharassment, as both may cause 
severe emotional distress on victims.205 Sexual harassment in the 
workplace and in academic institutions, however, is not criminalized 
but instead treated under Title VII and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act 
 
 198 See Deborah Ahrens, Schools, Cyberbullies, and the Surveillance State, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1669, 1696–97 (2012) (discussing legislative responses to suicides). 
 199 See Emily Bazelon, What Really Happened to Phoebe Prince?, SLATE (July 20, 2010, 10:13 
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2260952/entry/2260953. 
 200 See Jeff Glor, Cyberbullying Continued After Teen’s Death, CBS NEWS (Mar. 29, 2010, 7:26 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cyberbullying-continued-after-teens-death. 
 201 See Waldman, supra note 194, at 386–87. 
 202 Id. at 436–37. 
 203 See Caplan, supra note 181, at 853–54 (noting that the statutory language of civil 
harassment provisions should focus on unconsented contact that cause fear for one’s safety and 
intrusion into one’s privacy). 
 204 Id. at 829–31. 
 205 See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Criminalizing Coerced Submission in the Workplace and 
in the Academy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409 (2010). 
BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL.36.5.2 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:27 PM 
2015] OVERCRIMINALIZING S PEEC H  1701 
 
of 1964.206 Several explanations may be offered to account for the fact 
that cyberharassment is often criminalized, while discrimination-based 
harassment is not. First, sexual harassment typically affects adults while 
cyberharassment typically affects minors who may be more vulnerable 
and in greater need for the criminal law’s protection. A second  
explanation may rest on the assumption that criminally prohibiting 
cyberharassment also aims to prevent the potential risk of victims’ 
suicides, a risk that is notably absent in the discriminatory harassment 
context. 
Having established the assertion that criminal prohibitions on 
cyberharassment serves as yet another prophylactic measure leads to the 
contention that such use of the endangerment rationale exemplifies an 
unwarranted trajectory toward expanding the scope of endangerment 
speech crimes. To be sure, this Article’s critique of criminal 
cyberharassment statutes nowhere suggests that cyberharassment is not 
an extremely harmful conduct inflicting serious psychological injuries. 
Contrary to several commentators who believe that the infliction of 
emotional distress does not warrant criminalization, this Article does 
not contend that this type of harm never justifies criminal 
prohibition.207 By contrast, it argues that inflicting severe emotional 
harm is a serious injury that may justify the imposition of criminal 
sanctions, in the appropriate circumstances. The following reasons, 
however, demonstrate why, for the most part, cyberharassment is just 
not one of the cases justifying criminal sanction. 
First, criminalizing cyberharassment is in tension with criminal 
law theory that generally rejects negligence as sufficient mens rea.208 
Under contemporary criminal law, the default mens rea is typically 
recklessness, thus requiring a conscious disregard of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of harm.209 Commentators note that psychological 
research shows that much crime is the product of normal adolescent 
development and that adolescents often engage in common childhood 
wrongdoing, making poorly-considered decisions due to their 
susceptibility to negative influences and external pressures.210 
Perpetrators of cyberharassment are typically immature teenagers, often 
not fully aware of the consequences of their risky behaviors. These 
young perpetrators’ mens rea is ambiguous, typically falling short of 
 
 206 Id. at 410–11. 
 207 See Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 41, at 81–83 (rejecting criminalization of inflicting 
emotional harm). 
 208 See Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 931, 932 (2000) (noting that negligence is typically insufficient for imposing 
criminal liability). 
 209 Id. at 932–35. 
 210 See Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: 
The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 385–87 (2013). 
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intent, awareness, or even conscious disregard of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of inflicting substantial harm. Criminalizing 
cyberharassment is thus grounded on a mens rea of negligence, which is 
an unwarranted expansion of criminal liability. 
Second, grounding criminal liability on the endangerment 
justification raises insurmountable problems of causation. Arguably, 
since an independent actor—the bullied victim—intervenes by causing 
her own death, perpetrators cannot reasonably foresee this 
consequence, as they often lack actual awareness that their behavior 
would lead others to commit suicide.211 Suicide is too remote and 
unforeseeable a consequence of bullying. Proving the nexus between the 
cyberharassment and the ensuing suicide beyond a reasonable doubt is 
an impossible requirement to meet at a criminal trial. 
Finally, criminal statutes against cyberharassment are unwarranted 
because they are typically passed in response to public outcry exerting 
political pressure on legislatures to provide harsh criminal sanctions on 
bullying.212 Commentators have long noted the role that strong 
emotions—mainly fear, anger, and hatred—play in promoting 
legislation aimed at solving pressing social problems.213 Examples of 
statutes that draw heavily on communities’ outrage include not only 
cyberharassment but also terrorism and pedophilia, often leading to 
similar concerns regarding the risk of overreaching.214 Drawing solely 
on the public’s emotional responses and need for vindictive measures 
should not serve as justification for criminalization as such statutes are 
often hastily drafted, without fully weighing the high costs of 
criminalization against its limited benefits. 
2.     Instructional Speech 
Instructional speech consists of speech that gives people factual 
information that can assist them in the commission of crimes.215 
Examples include the dissemination of information explaining how to 
make bombs, cook methamphetamine, grow marijuana, and evade 
 
 211 See Waldman, supra note 194, at 431–33 (discussing causation problems). 
 212 See Ahrens, supra note 198, at 1696 (discussing the public’s outcry following teens’ 
suicides). 
 213 See Erik Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 74 
(2009). 
 214 See Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophilia, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 345, 359–
63, 377–80 (2003) (discussing similar rhetoric used in terrorism and pedophilia cases that stem 
from the public’s strong emotional responses to both problems). 
 215 See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1097, 1103 (2005) 
(noting that instructional speech also consists of information on how to commit other harmful 
conduct such as torts). 
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taxes.216 Criminally instructional speech consists of two categories. First, 
speech that results in the commission of a crime may be prosecuted 
under aiding and abetting statutes.217 Second, speech that has not yet 
resulted in the commission of a specific crime, but creates a risk that a 
crime might be committed in the future.218 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
not yet squarely confronted the scope of First Amendment protection in 
instructional speech cases.219 Many lower courts, however, uphold 
instructional speech restrictions, noting that they do not implicate the 
First Amendment.220 
Criminal prohibitions against instructional speech manifest yet 
another example of overcriminalizing speech. The following case is 
illustrative. In 1999, Congress passed an amendment to the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 
The amendment provides in pertinent part: 
(2) Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any person— 
(A) to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a 
destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to 
distribute by any means information pertaining to, in whole or in 
part, the manufacture or use of an explosive, destructive device, 
or weapon of mass destruction, with the intent that the teaching, 
demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance of, 
an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence . . . .221 
In United States v. Austin, the defendant was prosecuted under the 
above-referenced statute for material posted on his website, titled “raise 
the fist.”222 The site expressed the defendant’s anarchist views and 
included a “Reclaim Guide” with instructions for disrupting 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank events. The guide, which 
the defendant claimed not to have written himself but to have copied 
from another website, contained sections on “Police Tactics and How 
To Defeat Them” and “Defensive Weapons” that included bombmaking 
 
 216 Id. at 1096–97 (providing examples of information facilitating the commission of crimes). 
 217 See Leslie Kendrick, Note, A Test For Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 VA. L. REV. 1973, 
1979 (2005). 
 218 Id. 
 219 Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the petition 
for writ of certiorari). 
 220 Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Dahlstrom, 
713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 624 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 221 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(A) (2012). 
 222 United States v. Austin, No. CR-02-884-SVW (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2003); see also H. Brian 
Holland, Inherently Dangerous: The Potential for an Internet-Specific Standard Restricting Speech 
That Performs a Teaching Function, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 365–66 (2005); Brian McWilliams, FBI 
Raid Silences Teen Anarchist’s Site, NEWSBYTES (Jan. 31, 2002, 12:15 AM), 
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/raisethefist/msgs/newsbytes-2002-01-31.txt. 
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instructions. Austin was convicted and sentenced to one year in federal 
prison.223 
The Austin case demonstrates the risks of prohibiting expansive 
categories of criminally instructional speech. By classifying viewpoints 
posted on the Internet as criminally instructional speech, the statute 
enables the criminalization of speech based merely on the possible 
potential for harm flowing from its content, even if such harm is only 
slightly probable. The broadly worded statute enables conviction even in 
cases where there is no evidence that anyone is likely to use the 
instructions or that the defendant intended for anyone to use them. The 
use of the statute as applied to the defendant’s conduct in this case 
violates his constitutional right to speak.224 Prohibiting criminally 
instructional speech may sometimes be justified to prevent the risks of 
grave harms, thus making the statute facially constitutional. For 
example, holding an individual criminally liable for providing another 
with detailed instructions on how to commit suicide bombing, 
intending that he commit a terrorist act, is uncontested, even if 
eventually the bomb did not go off. However, criminalization ought to 
be limited to cases where there is proof of the speaker’s dangerousness, 
including his intent to assist in the commission of a crime, as well as 
evidence demonstrating substantial probability that the speech might 
facilitate the crime the speaker intended.225 Since Austin was resolved in 
a plea agreement, it remains unclear whether the government had 
sufficient evidence to prove these requirements.226 
C.     Possession Crimes 
The widespread use of cyberspace communication has resulted in a 
notable increase in the availability of child pornography on the 
Internet.227 The acknowledgement that children are a vulnerable group 
deserving unique protection has led to a uniformly severe legislative 
response, consisting of not only statutes that criminalize the production 
and distribution of child pornography, but also criminal sanctions on 
privately possessing such materials.228 In Osborne v. Ohio, the Court 
 
 223 See David Rosenzweig, Man Gets 1 Year for How-To on Explosives, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 
2003, at B3. 
 224 This Article raises “as applied”—as opposed to facial—challenges to the speech-based 
statutes at issue. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial 
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321–22 (2000) (summarizing the 
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges). 
 225 See Kendrick, supra note 217, at 2013. 
 226 Id. at 2013–14 (noting that too little information was available to evaluate the speech). 
 227 See Hessick, supra note 56, at 854–55. 
 228 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108–10 (1990) (upholding prohibitions against private 
possession of child pornography). 
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held that possession of child pornography is not constitutionally 
protected under the First Amendment, upholding criminalization based 
on the endangerment rationale.229 Possession of child pornography is 
perceived as a risk-creating behavior, consisting mainly of three types of 
risks.230 First, child pornography fuels viewers’ sexual fantasies, which 
can incite them to commit sexual offenses against children.231 Second, 
pedophiles use child pornography to “groom” children by convincing 
them that having sex with adults is acceptable.232 Third, possession of 
child pornography both creates and supports a market for the material, 
encouraging its further creation with the accompanying exploitation of 
children.233 
The justifications for current laws’ harsh penalties on possession of 
child pornography are highly disputed among social scientists.234 
Commentators suggest that existing empirical evidence fails to 
conclusively establish a causal link between mere possession of child 
pornography and actual contact offenses involving molestation of 
children.235 A detailed assessment of these arguments exceeds the scope 
of this Article. For present purposes, suffice it to say that current child 
pornography laws conflate different types of harms. The production and 
distribution of child pornography involves the actual sexual abuse of 
children, inflicting the most severe harms. The protection of children 
from such irreparable injuries justifies the harshest criminal sanctions, 
and this Article does not take issue with these statutes. The alleged 
harms stemming from private possession of child pornography, 
however, are much more ambiguous, given the lack of clear evidence 
that there is substantial probability that viewing child pornography 
leads to sexual offenses against minors. 
But even assuming that severe criminal penalties on private 
possession of child pornography are warranted, significant problems 
remain concerning the enormous scope of child pornography 
prohibitions and the precise definition of the images falling under it. 
These statutes contribute to the overcriminalization of speech because 
they often sweep within their reach innocuous materials that do not 
harm children. The problem stems from the overbroad and vague 
nature of these statutes.236 The phrase “child pornography” is broadly 
 
 229 Id. at 111–12. 
 230 See Hessick, supra note 56. 
 231 Id. at 871. 
 232 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 233 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759–61 (1982). 
 234 See Melissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade and Its Net-Widening Effect, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1679, 1693–95 (2012) (discussing the controversy among social scientists). 
 235 Id. at 1715–16. 
 236 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108–10, 112–14 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of 
an Ohio statute that makes it a crime to “possess[] or view[] . . . material or performance of a 
BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL.36.5.2 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:27 PM 
1706 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:1667 
 
defined to cover not only actual sexual acts with children but also sexual 
images of minors, involving mere nudity.237 Take for example, 
depictions of nudity in photographs and paintings, or sexualized images 
of minors in popular culture and fashion magazines.238 Arguably, 
possessing such images does not implicate the above justifications for 
banning possession of child pornography. 
Furthermore, as suggested earlier, the overcriminalization of 
speech stems not only from passing overbroad statutes, but also from 
prosecutorial overreaching.239 Existing child pornography statutes 
enable prosecutors to further expand criminalization above and beyond 
the traditional rationales justifying these prohibitions. One notable 
illustration of such prosecutorial overreaching involves charging 
teenagers for consensual sharing of sexually explicit photos via the 
Internet or cell phones, commonly known as sexting.240 The 
dissemination of any sexual material involving minors technically falls 
under the scope of child pornography laws.241 Criminal charges brought 
against adolescents for sexting each other, however, are often unjustified 
because their behaviors fall short of risking actual abuse of children.242 
When two teenagers consensually exchange explicit photos of 
themselves, none of the justifications for criminalizing possession of 
child pornography is present since the rationale of protecting an 
innocent child from an adult sexual predator is absent. Prosecuting 
sexting, thus, often results in charging adolescents with crimes even 
though their conduct does not amount to criminal wrongdoing.243 In 
light of the devastating effects of a criminal conviction on an 
adolescent’s future, stemming from the host of collateral consequences 
following conviction such as the “sex offender” label, the dangers of 
overcrminalizing this type of speech are disconcerting.244 
 
minor who is in a state of nudity . . . and where the person depicted is neither the child nor the 
ward of the person charged” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 237 See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A) (2012) (federal definition of child pornography, which 
constitutes visual depictions of actual children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, including, 
“(i) sexual intercourse . . . ; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or 
(v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person”). 
 238 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 128, 131 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (warning that the statute’s overbroad 
language enables the criminalization of “[p]ictures of topless bathers at a Mediterranean beach, 
[or] teenagers in revealing dresses”). 
 239 See supra Part I. 
 240 See Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 804 
(2012). 
 241 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (discussing the definition of child 
pornography). 
 242 See Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 15 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 513 (2008). 
 243 See Luna, supra note 240 (noting that adolescents are often prosecuted under child 
pornography laws even though they “might not appreciate that such behavior can be criminal”). 
 244 See Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender 
Commitment and Sicherungverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1621, 1626 (2003); see also Dr. 
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II.     THEORIES EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY 
The preceding Part demonstrates that the federal government and 
the states adopt numerous statutes that prohibit various forms of 
speech. At first blush, this finding may seem surprising in light of 
common perceptions concerning the scope of free speech protections 
under the Constitution. Conventional wisdom holds that the Court’s 
First Amendment jurisprudence is strongly protective of speech.245 
However, a closer look at the speech crimes discussed above illustrates 
that this generalization is inaccurate. The false assumption concerning 
the allegedly broad protection of speech obscures current criminal law’s 
trajectory, which is, in reality, far less protective of speech than many 
commentators assume.246 The following subparts explain why First 
Amendment doctrines fail to cover a host of speech crimes. 
A.     Speech Act Doctrines and Their Critique 
Constitutional theorists have long identified a division between 
speech and conduct, noting that the First Amendment protects the 
former but not the latter.247 Thomas Emerson has contended that while 
expression and action are always mingled and most conduct involves 
both, the “predominant element” in a course of conduct can be 
identified and First Amendment thereby determined.248 Speech is 
presumptively beyond governmental regulation when it possesses 
communicative qualities, expressing thoughts, ideas and viewpoints.249 
In contrast, conduct implicates little or no communicative value thus 
not triggering any First Amendment considerations and enabling the 
government to regulate it to effectuate significant interests such as harm 
prevention.250 
 
JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?, 48 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 951, 955 (2011) (noting that the Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of these 
prosecutions). 
 245 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (striking down a content-based 
restriction on speech). 
 246 But cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Lecture, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 733–34 
(2011) (noting that the Roberts Court is not a speech-protective court). 
 247 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (1970). 
 248 Id. at 80–86 (explaining the doctrinal distinction between speech and conduct). 
 249 See Edward J. Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public Discourse in America, 29 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1135, 1194 (1994) (noting the theoretical and philosophical justifications 
for protecting speech). 
 250 Id. 
BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL.36.5.2 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:27 PM 
1708 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:1667 
 
1.     Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct 
The 1949 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Giboney v. Empire 
Storage & Ice Co. stands for the proposition that the right to free speech 
under the First Amendment does not protect speech used as an integral 
part of conduct in violation of a criminal statute.251 The decision 
concerned the constitutionality of a Missouri law criminalizing “any 
pool, trust, agreement, combination, confederation or 
understanding . . . in restraint of trade or competition in the 
importation, transportation, manufacture, purchase or sale of any 
product or commodity.”252 The state attempted to use the law to enjoin 
union members from peaceful picketing carried on as an essential part 
of a course of conduct in violation of state law.253 The Court affirmed 
the conviction, holding that 
It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for 
speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as 
an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal 
statute. . . . [I]t has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of 
speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because 
the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means 
of language, either spoken, written, or printed.254 
Courts have often cited Giboney to justify a wide variety of 
restrictions on speech, including criminal statutes on conspiracies, 
solicitation, aiding and abetting, and more.255 The “speech integral to 
criminal conduct” exception has been used to target conduct that is 
viewed as specific tools used for the purpose of causing harm.256 For 
example, one court relied on Giboney in allowing liability for publishing 
a book that describes how to commit contract murder.257 Giboney’s 
exception, however, has not received any doctrinal articulation in more 
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases; the Court merely cites Giboney to 
support its decisions refusing to protect certain types of speech, without 
 
 251 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1949). 
 252 Id. at 491 n.1. 
 253 Id. at 491–92. 
 254 Id. at 498, 502. 
 255 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1283 n.22. While the distinction between speech and conduct 
is not limited to the criminal context, this Article focuses solely on criminal prohibitions on 
speech because of the nexus between the overcriminalization of speech argument and doctrines 
grounded in speech acts. See also Schauer, supra note 19, at 1766–67, 1801–02 (noting that both 
civil and criminal statutes implicate various restrictions on speech, requiring legislatures to draw 
the line between the communicative and noncommunicative elements of certain acts). 
 256 Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498; see also Volokh, supra note 21, at 1283. 
 257 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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providing guidelines on the scope of the exception.258 Scholarly 
treatment of Giboney has also proved unhelpful in clarifying its scope as 
commentators have not developed a coherent doctrinal framework 
grounded in this exception.259 
Given the difficulties in determining the distinction between 
speech and conduct, most commentators now recognize the fallacy of 
such division, arguing that definitively categorizing every behavior as 
either “speech” or “conduct” is not a feasible task.260 Words are often the 
exclusive means of prohibited forms of conduct, and conversely, 
conduct often expresses viewpoints and ideas.261 As John Hart Ely has 
noted, expressing political protest against the government often takes 
both the form of action and of speech and, therefore, attempts to 
determine which element “predominates” necessarily call for judgments 
about whether the activity should be protected.262 Commentators 
conclude that the “speech-conduct” distinction is unable to distinguish 
between speech that warrants free speech protection and one that does 
not.263 Instead, commentators have endeavored to develop an 
alternative analytical framework to determine which speech ought to be 
subject to First Amendment scrutiny.264 
2.     Generally Applicable Laws 
One doctrinal account attempting to explain which types of speech 
justify criminal sanction relies on the “generally applicable laws” 
argument.265 Speech should not be constitutionally protected when a 
generally applicable law that restricts all conduct that has similar 
harmful effects covers the prohibited behavior.266 This speech may be 
criminalized because “it is the act by which one either violates an 
independent criminal prohibition,” seemingly referring to prohibitions 
unrelated to speech, “or facilitates the violation of such a prohibition.”267 
For example, publishing a book with the intent to help readers commit a 
 
 258 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Searle v. Johnson, 646 
P.2d 682, 685 (Utah 1982). 
 259 See Morrison, supra note 116, at 901–03 (noting the absence of a coherent doctrine). 
 260 See Ely, supra note 27, at 1495–96 (noting that the distinction invites sophism and ad 
hocery). 
 261 See Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-
Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 856 (2012). 
 262 See Ely, supra note 27, at 1496. 
 263 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1284. 
 264 See Ely, supra note 27, at 1495–96. 
 265 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1281. 
 266 Id. at 1281–82 (noting that some commentators suggest that “generally applicable laws 
should be treated as content-neutral restrictions”). 
 267 Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas and 
Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 392 (2003); see id. at 377–78. 
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crime is punishable under generally applicable aiding and abetting law 
because this speech is simply the means of committing a criminal 
offense or the evidence of the crime.268 
A slightly different variation of this account draws on the Court’s 
seminal decision in United States v. O’Brien.269 O’Brien concerned a 
man who burned his draft card as part of a public antiwar protest, and 
was convicted under a federal law prohibiting the intentional 
destruction of Selective Service registration certificates.270 The O’Brien 
Court announced the following three-element test to determine when 
the state may ban speech: “[(1)] if [the statute] furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest; [(2)] if the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [(3)] if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”271 
The O’Brien test sets a key distinction in First Amendment 
jurisprudence between content-neutral and content-based restrictions 
on speech.272 Speech consisting of expressive conduct may be restricted 
because of harms flowing from its noncommunicative component, 
which is content-neutral. Examples include the destruction of Selective 
Service system, obstruction of traffic, and noise violations.273 However, 
speech may not be restricted because of harms flowing from its 
communicative component, which is content-based, unless these 
restrictions fall under one of the recognized exceptions to free speech 
such as incitement, threats, and obscenity, or pass the strict scrutiny 
test.274 
Relying on O’Brien, courts and commentators focus their attention 
on the government’s motives in regulating speech.275 If the 
government’s motives may be independently grounded on justifications 
unrelated to speech, then the criminal ban passes constitutional 
scrutiny. But if the government’s motives are related to the suppression 
of disfavored messages and silencing political dissent, the statute fails 
strict scrutiny review.276 Under this account, generally applicable laws 
should be treated similarly to content-neutral restrictions on expressive 
 
 268 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 269 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 270 Id. at 369. 
 271 Id. at 377. 
 272 Id. at 382 (noting that the restriction implicates only the noncommunicative impact of the 
conduct). 
 273 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1278. 
 274 Id. at 1284. 
 275 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 427–32 (1996); Kahan et al., supra note 261, at 
856–57; Rubenfeld, supra note 23, at 775–77. 
 276 Kahan et al., supra note 261, at 885–87 & n.127. 
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conduct, and thus should be upheld under O’Brien as speech restrictions 
that are incidental to the law’s overall thrust.277 
The problem with the “generally applicable laws” doctrine, 
however, is that it enables criminalization of content-based restrictions 
on speech without subjecting them to First Amendment scrutiny.278 As 
the examples in Part I demonstrate, the speech at issue there is 
criminalized based on its communicative message, namely, because its 
content informs, persuades, or offends others, and because of the harms 
that flow from this informing, persuasion, or offense. Yet, the “generally 
applicable laws” doctrine excludes First Amendment analysis from 
many speech restrictions even though they target speech precisely 
because of the content that speech communicates. Criminalizing speech 
based on its content is in tension with the O’Brien test, under which 
speech cannot be restricted because of the harm that flows from its 
content unless it passes strict scrutiny.279 
Moreover, generally applicable prohibitions cannot be upheld as 
facially content-neutral when they are content-based as applied.280 
When the prohibition is triggered based on the harm stemming from 
the content of the speech, First Amendment scrutiny should apply.281 
Instead of relying on the “generally applicable laws” standard, the 
relevant question that ought to determine the scope of free speech 
protection should be whether the statute at issue prohibits speech 
because of the harm that flows from its content.282 When a statute 
punishes speech because the harms are caused by the persuasive, 
informative, or offensive elements of the opinions expressed, that 
statute should be treated as a content-based restriction on speech and 
therefore subject to full-fledged First Amendment scrutiny.283 
Furthermore, the usual free speech considerations should apply here, 
including mainly the type of harm that speech may cause, the value of 
the speech and the risk that the restriction would create a chilling effect, 
resulting in prohibiting permissible forms of speech.284 
An additional drawback of the “generally applicable laws” doctrine 
is that the government’s motives have only limited relevance in 
assessing the constitutionality of speech restrictions. The examples set 
forth in Part I illustrate that the government’s motives for regulating 
speech appear perfectly legitimate and unrelated to suppressing political 
 
 277 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382; see also Volokh, supra note 21, at 1281–83 & nn.13, 15–18.  
 278 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1287. 
 279 Id. at 1284. 
 280 Id. at 1284–87. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1971) (holding that the law was directed at Cohen 
because of the offensive content of his message). 
 283 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1284–87. 
 284 Id. at 1339. 
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dissent.285 Legislatures often have ample bases for adopting generally 
applicable prohibitions and there is no basis for suspecting that they had 
any impermissible motivation with regard to suppressing speech.286 For 
example, aiding and abetting statutes are motivated by promoting social 
goods that can be defined independently of the government’s hostility to 
disfavored ideas.287 But even when legislatures’ motivations are not 
grounded on impermissible considerations, the result of adopting 
generally applicable prohibitions is often sweeping among others 
content-based restrictions on speech.288 Statutes should, therefore, be 
presumptively unconstitutional when applied to speech based on its 
content, regardless of whether they are well motivated and benign. 
These may be upheld only if they pass strict scrutiny review, just as is 
the case for statutes that on their face adopt content-based restrictions. 
3.     The Theory of Communicative Action 
Lawrence Solum’s 1989 paper draws on the theory of 
communicative action to explain which speech warrants First 
Amendment protection and which does not.289 The theory, which was 
developed by German philosopher Jurgen Habermas, distinguishes 
between communicative action, oriented at the coordination of 
behavior through rational agreement, and strategic behavior, in which 
speech is used to manipulate, coerce, or deceive.290 Solum suggests that 
the theory of communicative action be used to demarcate the boundary 
between speech that warrants constitutional protection and speech that 
does not.291 Under this theory, the First Amendment freedom of speech 
is interpreted as the freedom to engage only in communicative action. 
Therefore, the First Amendment protects only communicative action 
while strategic action remains unprotected speech.292 For example, the 
freedom of communicative action theory encompasses a right to 
advocate violent revolution because rational consensus on the 
legitimacy of the government use of force cannot be accomplished if 
advocacy of illegal conduct is prohibited.293 In contrast, strategic action 
is aimed at affecting others, not through the achievement of agreement 
 
 285 See supra Part I. 
 286 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1301–03. 
 287 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 242–45 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Kahan et al., 
supra note 261.  
 288 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1284–85. 
 289 See Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 55–56 (1989). 
 290 Id. at 91. 
 291 Id. at 106. 
 292 Id. at 107–09. 
 293 Id. at 122. 
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and understanding, but rather through means such as deception, 
coercion, and manipulation, thus underserving free speech 
protection.294 The distinction between communicative and strategic 
action explains the exclusion from First Amendment protection of a 
wide variety of strategic actions. Since strategic action includes speech 
acts that are beyond the scope of protection of the First Amendment, a 
probability assessment is not required in examining the 
constitutionality of the speech restriction, which may be upheld “even if 
the danger [posed by the speech] is fuzzy and remote.”295 
While the communicative action theory offers some important 
insights that explain the distinction between speech that warrants free 
speech protection and speech that does not, the theory is insufficient to 
account for more contemporary contexts that have arisen since it was 
first articulated in the 1980s. First, the communicative action theory 
precedes some recent changes, both in technological advancements such 
as the enormous spread of cybercommunication as well as challenges 
stemming from the emergence of new threats such as terrorism. Second, 
the main problem with the distinction between communicative and 
strategic action is that the vast majority of speech acts share the 
characteristics of both strategic and communicative action, thus 
drawing a clear line between them is impossible.296 For example, the 
theory is unable to determine whether terrorist speech that encourages 
violent terrorist attacks would be classified as predominately 
communicative or predominantly strategic, as such speech often 
contains both elements, aiming at achieving understanding among 
listeners as well as manipulating listeners. Third, another drawback in 
this theory is that determining that communicative action is protected 
speech does not resolve the more difficult question concerning the 
extent of the right at issue.297 Granted, there are certain circumstances 
that outweigh the right to engage in communicative action, but the 
theory does not elaborate on these limits. As Solum concedes, even 
though certain types of speech, such as advocacy of unlawful action, fall 
under the communicative action rubric, this speech might still be 
restricted if the communicative action is likely to lead to harmful 
strategic action which cannot be prevented by other means.298 
Therefore, the distinction between communicative and strategic action 
provides only the first step in evaluating the constitutionality of the 
speech. The necessary additional step in this inquiry must include a 
probability test, assessing the likelihood of future harm stemming from 
 
 294 Id. at 107. 
 295 Id. at 108. 
 296 Id. at 114. 
 297 Id. at 122. 
 298 Id. at 122–23. 
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the speech at issue. The theory of communicative action does not 
provide any mechanism for assessing this likelihood. 
4.     Situation-Altering Utterances 
An elaborate doctrinal explanation for the absence of free speech 
protection from many speech acts is developed in Kent Greenawalt’s 
book, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language.299 Greenawalt 
distinguishes between “assertions of fact and value,” which are 
statements about the way things are or should be, and are entitled to full 
First Amendment protection, and “situation-altering utterances,” which 
are ways of doing things, changing the world by altering normative 
obligations, and are not entitled to First Amendment protection.300 The 
latter category includesamong othersoffers, agreements, orders, 
permissions, and threats, which are tantamount to conduct and are 
subject to civil and criminal regulation.301 Greenawalt identifies four 
factors that may explain the circumstances under which the First 
Amendment applies: (1) speech that is public rather than private; (2) 
speech that is inspired by the speaker’s desire for social change rather 
than for private gain; (3) speech relating to something general rather 
than to a specific transaction; and (4) speech that is normative rather 
than informational in content.302 Conversely, these factors explain the 
absence of free speech coverage in circumstances where the speech is 
face-to-face, informational, particular, and for private gain. 
Greenawalt’s theory, however, is also unable to provide a sufficient 
conceptual framework that explains the absence of First Amendment 
scrutiny from the speech crimes discussed in Part I. One problem with 
this theory for today is that it is dated and does not account for the vast 
changes that have occurred since it was formulated in 1989. These 
changes include a significant increase in the scope of speech offenses, in 
the terrorism context as well as in other areas.303 These changes also 
consist of technological advancement affecting the nature of speech, 
mainly the enormous explosion in the use of the Internet as a primary 
form of speech. These legal and technological changes are not 
considered in Greenawalt’s proposed factors for distinguishing between 
protected and unprotected speech. For example, the spread of 
cyberspace communication has significantly blurred Greenawalt’s 
distinction between face-to-face communication and a general appeal to 
 
 299 See GREENAWALT, supra note 22. 
 300 Id. at 43–44, 57. 
 301 Id. at 43–44, 57–58. 
 302 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1801 (summarizing the four factors that Greenawalt has 
offered). 
 303 See supra Part I.A–C. 
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the public at large. Much speech in today’s virtual world, however, 
consists of expression that is publicly available on the Internet, reaching 
unidentified audience. Greenawalt’s theory fails to explain why a 
publication on the Internet, providing information on how to commit 
crimes may be criminalized even though this speech is targeted towards 
the public at large rather than towards a specific perpetrator. 
B.     Categorical Exclusion as Coverage and Its Critique 
Professor Frederick Schauer has offered a broader framework for 
considering speech falling outside the boundaries of the First 
Amendment.304 Schauer’s analysis first distinguishes between free 
speech protection and free speech coverage.305 The question of coverage, 
argues Schauer, consists of a preliminary inquiry asking whether an 
event that involves “speech” in the ordinary use of the word presents a 
First Amendment issue.306 Although the First Amendment broadly 
refers to “speech” much speech remains completely uncovered by it.307 
Only once the First Amendment covers certain type of speech, the 
question of its protection comes into play.308 Schauer notes that 
numerous verbal acts such as criminal solicitation, criminal conspiracy, 
and other forms of verbal participation in and facilitation of crime do 
not present any First Amendment inquiry.309 Importantly, under this 
account, the entire class of speech acts is categorically excluded from 
First Amendment scrutiny. Since whole categories of speech crimes lie 
well beyond the boundaries of the First Amendment, the arsenal of 
protections provided by free speech doctrines do not show up in the 
analysis.310 
Schauer further contends that no single theory or doctrinal 
principle explaining the First Amendment coverage has yet been 
found.311 The explanation for the lack of free speech coverage, argues 
Schauer, lies not only in legal doctrine.312 Instead, it lies in the 
combination of doctrines and a complex array of nonlegal, nondoctrinal 
factors, including political, cultural, and economic considerations 
 
 304 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1766–68. 
 305 Id. at 1769. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 1771. 
 308 Id. at 1769. 
 309 Id. at 1801. 
 310 Id. at 1769. 
 311 Id. at 1785–86. 
 312 Id. at 1787. 
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determining which speech the First Amendment covers and which it 
does not.313 
There are, however, several problems with this approach. First, it is 
mostly descriptive rather than proscriptive. Describing numerous forms 
of speech as uncovered by the First Amendment with only a small 
portion of speech subject to strict scrutiny review says little with respect 
to the normative question of whether speech acts should be subject to 
First Amendment analysis. Schauer’s account does not explain whether 
the categorical exclusion of First Amendment scrutiny from all speech 
acts is indeed a proper approach from a normative perspective. 
Moreover, while the theory unfolds the broad political and institutional 
reasons for subjecting certain speech to First Amendment scrutiny, it 
does not provide a separate scheme consisting of legal criteria for 
distinguishing between different types of speech. 
The categorical exclusion account also lacks practical utility 
because of its indeterminate nature. This theory falls short of offering an 
analytical framework that would be able to draw, in advance, a 
principled legal boundary between speech that warrants free speech 
protection and one that does not. This account thus leads to 
inconsistent outcomes, and are unable to explain why some 
communicative messages are subject to free speech protections, while 
others are restricted even though both types of speech may result in 
harmful consequences. Take, for example, the different legal treatment 
of hate speech and harassing speech. Hate speech, including racist 
expressions, falls within the boundaries of the First Amendment even 
though it is clearly harmful, inflicting emotional distress on victims.314 
In contrast, verbal harassment, another type of harmful speech inflicting 
emotional distress on victims, falls outside the scope of First 
Amendment coverage and is subject to civil and criminal regulation.315 
Second, the categorical exclusion account precludes the use of any 
balancing mechanisms to evaluate the constitutionality of specific 
examples of speech acts. One of the key distinctions in First 
Amendment jurisprudence is the division between categorization and 
balancing.316 Balancing approaches weigh individuals’ interests in 
asserting a right against the government’s interests in regulating it and 
determine which interest ought to prevail in a specific case.317 In 
contrast, categorization prohibits this kind of weighing of interests in 
 
 313 Id. at 1787, 1800–01. 
 314 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–84, 391 (1992). 
 315 See Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 186, at 695–96 (discussing criminalization of 
cyberharassment). 
 316 See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 383–84 (2009) (discussing the distinctions between categorization and 
balancing). 
 317 Id. at 381. 
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individual cases by inquiring only whether the case falls into certain 
predetermined, outcome-determinative lines.318 
Contemporary First Amendment opinions use the rhetoric of 
balancing of interests rather than categorically excluding entire classes 
of speech from First Amendment coverage.319 Commentators thus agree 
that the balancing approach has generally prevailed, largely replacing 
categorization as the preferred mode of First Amendment protection.320 
A notable exception to this general preference is current law’s treatment 
of speech acts, which is still grounded in a categorical approach.321 As 
Part I illustrates, entire classes of speech acts are currently categorically 
excluded from First Amendment scrutiny. No balancing tests are used 
when suppressing speech in a given case falling under the speech act 
classification, regardless of the specific circumstances underlying the 
specific speech. 
The main problem with this categorical exclusion is that it is over-
inclusive. It precludes First Amendment scrutiny from specific speech 
acts that do carry communicative messages and, thus, might warrant 
free speech protection. Casting entire categories of speech crimes 
outside the First Amendment’s ambit, based solely on the prohibition’s 
classification, impede a more nuanced, case-by-case examination of 
whether a particular conspiracy, instructional speech, or verbal 
harassment warrants criminal sanction. This wholesale exclusion fails to 
distinguish between various degrees of harm stemming from different 
types of speech. For example, the sexting prosecutions discussed above 
demonstrate that free speech protection is categorically precluded even 
from nonharmful expressions, since they fall under an uncovered 
category.322 In contrast, a balancing approach weighs “competing 
interests in maintaining free and open expression on the one hand 
[while] assuring security and preventing [harm] on the other.”323 A 
typical strict scrutiny analysis applies such a balancing process, enabling 
courts to assess whether in specific cases individuals’ liberty to express 
certain messages should outweigh others’ right not to be harmed by the 
speech’s potential outcomes. Balancing, therefore, provides a much-
needed flexibility by allowing courts to evaluate the costs and benefits 
underlying a particular speech on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 318 Id. 
 319 See Rubenfeld, supra note 23, at 779 (noting that contemporary First Amendment opinions 
are loaded with the rhetoric of balancing). 
 320 See Blocher, supra note 316, at 386 (noting that balancing is the preferred mechanism in 
First Amendment jurisprudence). 
 321 Id. at 386–88 (observing that no balancing is needed in a given case for categories such as 
fraud or crime facilitating speech, which are entirely outside the bounds of free speech). 
 322 See supra Part I.C. 
 323 See Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of 
the McCarthy Era, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 9, 17–18 (2004). 
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Third, the categorical exclusion approach does not account for a 
host of free speech justifications underlying many speech acts. 
Categorical exclusion is premised on the assumption that speech acts 
implicate none of the theoretical rationales for protection therefore their 
regulation does not raise any serious First Amendment problems.324 
This assumption, however, is false. As the examples discussed in Part I 
demonstrate, many speech acts in fact consist of clearly communicative 
messages and as such they do implicate important justifications for First 
Amendment protection. 
Consider for example, a website consisting of instructions on how 
to cultivate marijuana plants in one’s backyard. While the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not yet resolved the question of the constitutionality of crime 
facilitating speech, legislatures often assume that such speech may be 
subject to criminal sanction.325 Excluding free speech considerations 
from all types of crime facilitating speech, however, is highly 
problematic if the actual purpose behind the publication is not to 
advocate any illegal action but instead to promote political change 
concerning the legal regulation of privately growing marijuana. 
Expressing politically motivated viewpoints by peacefully advocating 
legal change is the core justification behind free speech protection and, 
therefore, should be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. This 
ideologically grounded speech touches upon ample First Amendment 
concerns, most notably individuals’ liberty to freely express viewpoints 
that are disfavored by the government. 
C.     The Link Between Existing Doctrines and Overcriminalization of 
Speech 
The doctrines discussed above are directly responsible for the 
overcriminalization of speech for the following reasons. First, exposing 
the expansive scope of criminal statutes that are not touched by the First 
Amendment sharpens the fact that the speech with which the First 
Amendment deals is the exception, while the speech that may routinely 
be criminally prohibited is the general rule.326 The speech that the First 
Amendment ignores based on speech acts doctrines includes countless 
areas of content-based criminal prohibitions on speech. Among them 
lies the vast domain of criminal law dealing with conspiracy, 
 
 324 See Kent Greenawalt, “Clear and Present Danger” and Criminal Speech, in ETERNALLY 
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 97, 111 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 
2002).  
 325 See Volokh, supra note 215, at 1128–30 (noting that no Supreme Court case addresses 
crime-facilitating speech directly, but legislatures assume that this speech may be punished). 
 326 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1784 (“[T]he speech with which the First Amendment is even 
slightly concerned is but a small subset of the speech that pervades every part of our lives.”). 
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solicitation, attempt, crime facilitation, and verbal harassment.327 Those 
numerous speech offenses are precisely the crimes identified in Part I as 
contributing to the overcriminalization of speech. If these widely 
accepted restrictions on speech become the rule, the inevitable upshot is 
criminalizing too much speech. 
Second, since no single doctrine explains when speech falls within 
the coverage of the First Amendment, legislatures are granted unlimited 
discretion to enact an array of criminal statutes as they see fit. The 
reason for lawmakers’ unconstrained power is twofold. First, 
substantive criminal law is predominantly not constitutionalized.328 
Constitutional law places very few constraints on the definition of 
crimes, with limited exceptions concerning speech that is covered by the 
First Amendment, consensual sexual practices, and reproductive 
rights.329 Scholars have long suggested that constitutional scrutiny ought 
to be applied to substantive criminal law.330 The criminal law, however, 
has not yet developed significant constitutional doctrines for checking 
legislative action. The practical implications of this reality are crucial 
because different types of judicial review are applied to speech based on 
its categorization. Speech that is categorized as falling within the 
boundaries of the First Amendment is subject to strict scrutiny review 
that imposes much greater burdens than the highly deferential scrutiny 
of rationality review.331 The vast majority of speech restrictions that are 
measured against the stringent strict scrutiny review are struck down.332 
By contrast, speech acts categorically fall outside the scope of First 
Amendment coverage, thus they are not measured against the 
demanding strict scrutiny analysis.333 Instead, they are subject only to 
rational basis review, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. Under this 
test, the government only needs to demonstrate that the statute at issue 
is “rationally related” to a “legitimate” governmental reason offered as 
its justification—a standard that is easily satisfied.334 Statutes typically 
 
 327 Id. at 1801 (“[N]umerous verbal acts stand far outside the purview of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 328 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 509, 510 (2004) (noting that substantive criminal law is predominantly not 
constitutionalized). 
 329 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 123–24 (observing that most criminal statutes implicate 
nonfundamental rights and thus are subject only to rational basis review). 
 330 See Dubber, supra note 328, at 529–31 (advocating for constitutional constraints on 
criminal statutes). 
 331 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1770. 
 332 See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why is this Right Different from All Other 
Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 822 (1994) (noting that statutes typically fail strict scrutiny 
review). 
 333 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1801–02. 
 334 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14, 314 n.6 (1993) (applying rational basis 
review). 
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pass that scrutiny, which is very deferential to the government.335 The 
upshot is that speech crimes that are measured against the lenient 
rational basis review are almost always upheld, therefore directly 
contributing to the overcriminalization of speech. 
An additional reason explaining legislatures’ unconstrained 
discretion stems from the fact that substantive criminal law is not 
grounded in a comprehensive theory.336 Scholars note that there are no 
conceptual boundaries to criminalization or clear criterion limiting the 
scope of criminal statutes.337 Substantive criminal law, they further note, 
is not grounded on a coherent framework under which criminalization 
decisions are based solely on harmful, fault-based culpable conducts.338 
Moreover, the concept of harm itself eludes definition, allowing 
criminalization without proof of injury or wrongdoing.339 The upshot of 
the lack of a comprehensive theory of criminalization is that legislatures 
often succumb to political pressures by enacting statutes that satisfy 
their constituents’ demands.340 In the absence of a theory that 
constraints legislatures’ crime creation choices, the problem of 
overcriminalization of speech is further exacerbated. 
D.     An Alternative Framework for Considering Speech Acts 
A notable alternative analytical framework to assess the 
constitutionality of speech crimes lies in Eugene Volokh’s work.341 
Volokh rejects the doctrines that are currently used to preclude First 
Amendment consideration from many speech crimes.342 As an 
alternative to relying on speech acts doctrines, Volokh proposes that all 
speech crimes be subject to full-fledged strict scrutiny review.343 
Determining whether any given speech crime warrants constitutional 
protection, Volokh argues, requires an examination of factors usually 
considered under a typical First Amendment inquiry, such as the value 
of speech and the harm that it causes.344 For example, in an attempt to 
 
 335 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (remarking 
on the leniency of rational basis review). 
 336 See Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal Law Be Controlled?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 971, 972–73 
(2010) (reviewing DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(2008)). 
 337 Id. at 971–72 (discussing the absence of a comprehensive theory underlying 
criminalization). 
 338 Id. 
 339 Id. at 971. 
 340 See Stuntz, supra note 10, at 529–30. 
 341 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1284. 
 342 Id. (rejecting prevailing explanations for excluding free speech protection from many 
speech crimes). 
 343 Id. 
 344 Id. at 1338–39. 
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consider an independent analytical framework for determining the 
constitutionality of crime-facilitating speech, Volokh considers possible 
distinctions within this specific category, which would distinguish 
between protected and prohibited forms of crime-facilitating speech.345 
Providing information that is helpful in the commission of a crime, 
contends Volokh, generally ought to be constitutionally protected 
unless several limited circumstances apply (when the speech is “said 
to . . . a small group of people [and] the speaker knows [that they] are 
likely to use the information for criminal purposes[; when the speech] 
has almost no noncriminal value[; or when] it can cause extraordinarily 
serious harm”).346 
Volokh’s contribution provides an important starting point for 
further exploration of the idea of subjecting all content-based speech 
crimes, regardless of the category into which they currently fall, to First 
Amendment scrutiny. Volokh himself recognizes that his proposal only 
outlines the task of delineating the proper constitutional boundaries of 
speech offenses, and that a considerable amount of work remains to be 
done.347 The next Part takes up that call to engage in an analytical 
undertaking that would better draw the line between speech that 
warrants protection and one that does not. 
III.     A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITING THE SCOPE OF ENDANGERMENT SPEECH 
CRIMES 
The following proposal advocates the adoption of several 
constraints to limit the criminalization of speech. 
A.     External and Internal Constraints on Criminalizing Speech 
Considering a broader conceptual framework that would limit the 
scope of criminalization in general, Douglas Husak advocates the 
adoption of both external and internal constraints on criminal 
statutes.348 These external constraints draw on existing constitutional 
doctrine of judicial review, while the internal constraints draw on 
criminal law theory itself.349 The following proposal builds on Husak’s 
general framework by applying it to the specific area of endangerment 
speech crimes. 
 
 345 See Volokh, supra note 215, at 1104–06. 
 346 Id. at 1106. 
 347 Volokh, supra note 21, at 1286. 
 348 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 64–67. 
 349 Id. at 128–32. 
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The first key feature of this Article’s proposal to limit the scope of 
endangerment speech crimes calls for extending strict scrutiny review to 
all of these crimes, including those currently viewed as speech acts that 
are categorically excluded from First Amendment coverage. The 
proposal substitutes a specialized case-by-case balancing of competing 
interests underlying specific speech crimes for existing categorical 
exclusion of free speech coverage based on labeling many types of 
speech as “speech act.” 
Part II elaborates on the arguments justifying the application of 
strict scrutiny review on all speech crimes.350 To reiterate the main 
points made above, the speech crimes discussed in Part I prohibit 
speech because of the harm that flows from its content, namely, because 
of its communicative element. When speech is restricted because the 
message it conveys informs, advocates, or persuades others, these 
restrictions are content-based and, similarly to other fundamental 
rights, they ought to be subject to full-fledged strict scrutiny review.351 A 
typical First Amendment analysis engages in a balancing process 
between the value of a given speech and the harm it inflicts.352 A similar 
balancing process should also be used to evaluate the constitutionality of 
all speech crimes, including those currently excluded from First 
Amendment scrutiny. This balancing should take into account the 
factors that are generally applicable under a typical First Amendment 
analysis, such as the magnitude of the harm, the value of speech, and the 
risk that punishing speech would deter constitutionally protected 
speech.353 
Endangerment speech crimes, however, demonstrate why applying 
only external constitutional constraints may prove insufficient to limit 
their scope. First Amendment doctrines do not lend themselves to 
drawing a legal line between behaviors that warrant criminal bans and 
those that warrant only civil restrictions, such as tort actions, 
injunctions, or administrative measures.354 Typically, under a First 
Amendment analysis, bans on speech are either upheld or rejected, 
without carving out distinctions between criminal and civil 
restrictions.355 First Amendment scrutiny applies similar standards of 
review to both types of restrictions without suggesting that the 
 
 350 See supra Part II.A. 
 351 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul,  505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992)). 
 352 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519, 524–25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (suggesting 
that free speech demands weighing of the competing interests). 
 353 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1339 (noting factors generally applicable in a First 
Amendment scrutiny). 
 354 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan (N.Y. Times v. Sullivan), 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964). But cf. Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 710–11 (1931). 
 355 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277. 
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government might enjoy less constitutional leeway when regulating 
speech through criminal means.356 In light of this feature of the First 
Amendment, constitutional constraints on criminalization of 
endangerment speech crimes must be supplemented with internal 
constraints. 
The proposed limits on endangerment speech crimes should also 
include several internal constraints stemming from criminal law theory. 
Professor Husak proposes that these constraints consist of the following 
factors: criminalization is justified only when criminal statutes target 
nontrivial harms or evils,357 address only wrongful conduct,358 impose 
punishment only on offenders who deserve it,359 and carry a heavy 
burden of proof justifying them.360 While Husak’s proposal outlines an 
overall framework for limiting the scope of criminalization in general, 
he also examines several constraints on risk-creation offenses.361 
Husak’s theory, however, does not recognize that notable examples of 
risk-creation offenses include speech crimes, and thus his analysis does 
not separately consider these offenses. As the preceding parts 
demonstrate, endangerment speech crimes raise additional concerns 
stemming from the fact that they prohibit speech based on the harm 
that flows from its content. The distinct problems arising from the 
criminalization of speech are unaccounted for in Husak’s proposal. The 
following proposal seeks to fill this gap by developing constitutional 
constraints specifically designed for endangerment speech crimes. In 
what follows, this Article will separately consider factors that should be 
incorporated into strict scrutiny analysis and those that ought to shape 
internal criminal law constraints. 
1.     Relevant Factors to Structure Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
This subsection articulates a framework for considering the 
constitutionality of endangerment speech crimes by offering several 
guidelines to structure judicial inquiry into the elements of a strict 
scrutiny analysis. 
a.     A Probability Test: Substantial Probability of Harm 
A key factor in evaluating the constitutionality of endangerment 
speech crimes should consist of a judicial inquiry into the probability of 
 
 356 See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the 
First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1007 & n.72 (2013). 
 357 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 65–66. 
 358 Id. at 66. 
 359 Id. at 82–83. 
 360 Id. at 83–84. 
 361 Id. at 159–70 (addressing limits on risk-creation crimes). 
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harm that may flow from the content of the speech at issue. To satisfy 
strict scrutiny analysis, I propose that the government be required to 
establish a clear nexus between the speech in question and the 
likelihood of harm. More specifically, the government would have to 
demonstrate that given the content and the context of the speech it 
wants to ban, there is a substantial probability that the speech would 
result in grave harm. Requiring such probability test is necessary 
because criminal sanctions are unjustified in circumstances where 
speech merely creates a remote possibility or mere tendency for future 
harm. A probability test thus ensures that only dangerous perpetrators 
are held criminally liable for their speech. 
The probability test advocated here draws on existing probability 
standards already in use under free speech doctrines. The Court 
currently employs one probability mechanism in an important line of 
cases concerning violence-inducing speech.362 The doctrines embodied 
in these cases incorporate what commentators refer to as “probability 
thresholds.”363 A “probability threshold” sets a predefined lower 
boundary on how likely a potential harm must be in order for that harm 
to be assessed in the constitutional analysis. Under this inquiry, courts 
will not engage in balancing the benefits of speech against the possible 
harm from that speech in those cases in which the likelihood of harm is 
so low that the probability that it would occur does not cross the 
minimum threshold.364 The Brandenburg decision discussed above is 
the prime example of the Court’s application of “probability 
thresholds.”365 Recall that incitement doctrine requires, among others, 
that the speech be likely to incite violence—an explicit probability 
threshold that eliminates from consideration all low-probability 
harms.366 
While inciting speech is subject to a demanding probability test, 
probability assessments are currently not incorporated into the Court’s 
strict scrutiny analysis, which lacks an explicit doctrinal probability 
component.367 The cases discussed in Part I exemplify the implications 
of the absence of a probability test.368 These examples demonstrate that 
courts do not impose any bars against asserting extremely low-
probability harms as the basis for suppressing various forms of 
expression. Criminal prohibitions on speech acts are often based on 
questionable predictions of dangerousness, without requiring any 
 
 362 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 363 See Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293 (2007). 
 364 Id. at 1297. 
 365 Id. at 1307. 
 366 Id. at 1306. 
 367 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–38 (applying heightened scrutiny 
without discussing the probability of harm). 
 368 See supra Part I.A–C. 
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likelihood that the speech would result in any harm.369 In the absence of 
a probability requirement, mere tendency to cause harm or an increase 
in the propensity of violence suffice for enacting numerous speech 
crimes.370 The ultimate result of refusing to incorporate any probability 
test as a threshold condition for criminalizing these types of speech is 
the overcriminalization of speech. 
Speech restrictions in the terrorism context best illustrate the risks 
of a failure to include a probability requirement for evaluating the 
constitutionality of a specific speech crime. As previously noted, while 
the HLP Court noted that the speech in question increases the 
probability of a future terrorist attack, it did not require substantial or 
high likelihood that such grave harm to national security would 
ensue.371 The refusal to incorporate a probability test is particularly 
problematic in the national security context due to what Cass Sunstein 
dubs “probability neglect”: the tendency among policy makers to 
disregard probability assessments when making decisions under 
indeterminate conditions.372 This type of bias, the argument continues, 
is especially prominent when considering the probability of events that 
trigger the public’s strong emotional responses, e.g., terrorism.373 
Several factors explain how the importance of low-probability threats is 
exaggerated. First, the government tends to inflate the risks of low-
probability speech it attempts to suppress. Second, individuals tend to 
overvalue the danger of low-probability risks, and finally, dreadful 
threats such as terrorism trigger much stronger responses compared to 
low-probability risks in other contexts.374 The examples discussed in 
Part I demonstrate that criminal prosecutions often draw on the public’s 
strong emotional response to what it perceives as dire dangers especially 
in the areas of terrorism and speech endangering minors including 
sexual expression and cyberharassment. 
Several commentators have considered incorporating probability 
assessments into strict scrutiny review.375 One commentator suggests 
that probabilities may be examined when asking whether the restriction 
 
 369 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2(a) (1980) (proscribing the creation of “public 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm,” if a person, with intent or recklessness, in any public place 
engages in conduct having a direct tendency to cause acts of violence). 
 370 See supra Part I.A–C. 
 371 See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 4–6. 
 372 See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE 
L.J. 61, 62–70 (2002). 
 373 Id. at 83–85, 94–95. 
 374 See Masur, supra note 363, at 1298. 
 375 See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, The Death and Rebirth of the Clear and Present Danger Test, in 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MORTON J. 
HORWITZ 211, 220–23 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1330 (2007). 
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is narrowly tailored, especially if asking whether it is overinclusive.376 
Alternatively, other commentators suggest that probability assessments 
may be considered as part of the inquiry whether the state interest is 
sufficiently compelling.377 Under both accounts, to satisfy the strict 
scrutiny review, the government would be required to establish a much 
stronger causal link between the speech in question and the future harm 
before it can criminalize speech.378 Drawing upon these ideas, this 
Article proposes that probability assessments be incorporated into a 
strict scrutiny review of all speech crimes. As of yet, the Court has not 
adopted a probability threshold as part of its strict scrutiny analysis. 
Having established the significance of probability assessments, the 
next question is what level of probability should be required. Alternative 
probability tests range from the highest level of probability, requiring 
near certainty or very high likelihood, to a less demanding test requiring 
substantial probability, culminating in the far more lax “reasonable 
consequences” standard. 
Brandenburg’s “high likelihood” test has proved an extremely 
onerous, if not impossible, threshold to satisfy.379 This test fails to take 
into consideration the distinct dangers that terrorism-related speech 
poses.380 It also fails to account for the enormous proliferation of 
cyberspace communication. Extending the Brandenburg test to 
additional contexts is, therefore, unwarranted. To curb significant risks 
of future harm, falling short of satisfying the “high likelihood” 
requirement, the Brandenburg test’s stringent elements should be 
relaxed by adopting an alternative probability test. 
A much less demanding standard, however, such as one grounded 
in “reasonable consequences,” should also be rejected. When speech 
only reasonably increases the chances of some future harm, criminal 
sanctions are unjustified for the following reasons. First, this lax 
standard is inconsistent with the Court’s current application of 
probability thresholds in the incitement context under which criminal 
restrictions on speech may be upheld only when harms reach a 
substantial level of probability. Second, a “reasonable consequences” 
requirement is in tension with the special status that speech enjoys 
under the First Amendment. The premise underlying contemporary 
free speech jurisprudence is that American society is willing to tolerate 
low-probability risks by setting a high threshold for restricting 
 
 376 Fallon, supra note 375. 
 377 See Siegel, supra note 375, at 220. 
 378 Cf. Erik Luna, Essay, The Bin Laden Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1489, 1493–95 (2012) 
(discussing risk assessments in the terrorism context and considering the likelihood and 
consequences of given threats). 
 379 See John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 539, 570 (2006). 
 380 See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, What is War?: Reflections on Free Speech in 
“Wartime,” 36 RUTGERS L.J. 833, 848–51 (2005); Healy, supra note 51, at 726. 
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potentially injurious speech.381 The lenient “reasonable consequences” 
test falls short of satisfying this standard. 
Lastly, considering other areas of law where personal freedoms 
may be abridged based on some probability assessments further 
demonstrates that reasonable suspicion or mere chance of harm are 
typically insufficient to justify the encroachment on individual 
freedoms. The Fourth Amendment context is illustrative. It provides 
individuals with the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring that 
warrants to search and seizure shall be issued only upon probable 
cause.382 While the Court has never explicitly defined the term, it has 
held that “probable cause” means a “substantial chance” or “fair 
probability,” and that it is more than reasonable suspicion but less than 
a “more likely than not” standard.383 
The substantial probability standard offers a middle ground 
between the rigid high likelihood test and the lax “reasonable 
probability” one. Under the proposed test, the state would not be able to 
satisfy the strict scrutiny’s compelling interest prong if it is unable to 
demonstrate that there is substantial probability that the speech in 
question would result in grave harm. The test thus ensures that 
individuals would not be punished for speech falling short of substantial 
likelihood of serious harm. But is also ensures that while a real and 
significant prospect of harm is necessary, this requirement falls short of 
high likelihood, which under Brandenburg has evolved into near 
certainty. 
One critical component of the substantial probability test is 
assessing the specific context against which the speech is expressed. 
Probability tests typically rely on the content of speech to judge its 
potential for harm.384 The underlying context under which the speech is 
disseminated, however, should play a crucial role in evaluating the 
likelihood of harm. Relevant factors that a probability assessment must 
account for include the identity of speakers, their role among the 
community, and their influence over listeners among the general public 
or specific individuals.385 Some speakers, mainly political and religious 
leaders, may have significant influence over their ideological supporters. 
 
 381 See Masur, supra note 363, at 1297. 
 382 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 383 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 243 & n.13 (1983). 
 384 See Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Gila Stopler, Probability Thresholds as Deontological Constraints 
in Global Constitutionalism, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 97–98 (2010); see also Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is whether the words used are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that 
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”). 
 385 See Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 485, 521 (2008). 
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Speech expressed by a Jewish rabbi, a Muslim imam, or a Christian 
minister has a potentially much greater effect compared to that of a 
layperson. The form and degree of the speaker’s influence among 
listeners thus help fact-finders determine the dangerousness of a given 
speech. 
b.     The Magnitude of the Harm 
The nature and severity of the harm that the speech may cause 
should also be a considered when assessing the constitutionality of 
endangerment speech crimes. Generally speaking, criminal law’s 
purpose is to prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts 
or threatens grave harm on others.386 Endangerment speech crimes, 
however, often enable criminalization based merely on inflicting trivial 
or minimal harm or even no harm at all because their definitions do not 
require that the prohibited behavior result in grave harm.387 The dated 
offense of public drunkenness is illustrative of the implications of the 
absence of this element.388 This offense has been traditionally defined as 
“the appearance of a person who is under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol in a place open to the general public.”389 The justification for the 
offense was based on the risk stemming from the perpetrator’s rowdy 
behavior, consisting mainly of various forms of speech and 
expression.390 The Georgia statute, for example, targets speech that is 
“boisterousness, by indecent condition or act, or by vulgar, profane, 
loud, or unbecoming language.”391 Other jurisdictions, however, 
criminalize appearance only to the degree that it may endanger the 
perpetrator or other persons or property or annoy persons in the 
defendant’s vicinity.392 Importantly, these prohibitions extend above 
and beyond behaviors that endanger actual harm to others to cover 
behaviors that merely offend or annoy others. Criminalization of public 
 
 386 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7 cmt. 44 (1980). 
 387 See supra Part I. 
 388 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 530, 535 (1968) (affirming conviction under public 
intoxication law). 
 389 United States v. Francisco, No. CR 06-1015 JB, 2008 WL 2367253, at *4 (D.N.M. Feb. 1, 
2008) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 663 (7th ed. 2000)); see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 123.46(2) 
(2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-47 (West 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-388 (West 2014); W. 
VA. CODE § 60-6-9(a)(1) (1999); see also United States v. Garcia-Sandobal, 703 F.3d 1278 (11th 
Cir. 2013) (discussing the scope of these statutes). 
 390 See, e.g., Martin v. State, 662 S.E.2d 185, 187–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding conviction 
of defendants under public drunkenness statutes for boisterous behavior in public places 
involving different forms of speech and expression); Ridley v. State, 337 S.E.2d 382, 383–84 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1985) (same). On trends towards decriminalizing public drunkenness, see Darryl K. 
Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 242–43 & nn.98–99 (2007). 
 391 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-41 (West 2014). 
 392 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1315 (West 2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5505 
(West 2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.02 (West 2014) (proscribing being intoxicated in 
public to the degree that a person may endanger himself or others). 
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drunkenness is, therefore, based on conduct merely giving offense to 
others, falling short of risking grave harm.393 The criminalization of 
public drunkenness, despite only risking either trivial/minimal harm or 
mere offensiveness, provides yet another illustration of the overlooked 
problem of overcriminalizing speech. 
The Court’s existing jurisprudence further enables criminalization 
of speech without proof of grave harm.394 For example, the Brandenburg 
test rejects a sliding scale approach, requiring high likelihood that the 
speech would lead to any law violation, regardless of the magnitude of 
its harm.395 The Court adheres to a “probability thresholds” approach, 
under which the magnitude of harm is not taken under consideration.396 
When low-probability, high-magnitude dangers speech is concerned, 
the Court does not engage in a cost-benefit analysis, which balances 
between competing interests, including the gravity of the harm. 
In contrast with the Court’s approach, commentators note that an 
alternative position that predominates both within the academy and 
among the lower courts is a cost-benefit analysis.397 This approach 
requires courts to balance the cost of dangerous speech—the harm that 
the expression is likely to cause if it is allowed—against the benefits one 
might expect the speech to produce. Speech warrants First Amendment 
protection only if its benefits outweigh its costs.398 Proponents of using 
cost-benefit analysis to decide free speech cases concede that the 
magnitude of the harm is a key factor in such analysis.399 For example, 
under a cost-benefit analysis the devastating harms of terrorism are a 
substantial cost that often outweighs the benefits of terrorism-related 
speech. Since the magnitude of harm inflicted by terrorism is so 
enormous, this factor heavily tips the scale towards precluding free 
speech protection, provided that the evidence demonstrates substantial 
likelihood of such harm. 
Here, this Article advocates the application of a cost-benefit 
analysis to measure the constitutionality of all endangerment speech 
crimes. This approach would balance between competing interests by 
taking into consideration, among others, the magnitude of the harm. 
Under the proposal, the state would satisfy the “compelling interest” 
requirement only if it proves that the speech it wants to ban risks not 
 
 393 See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 26 
(1984) (defining the offense principle). 
 394 See Jed Rubenfeld, Comment, A Reply to Posner, 54 STAN. L. REV. 753, 758 & n.23 (2002). 
 395 See Larry Alexander, Redish on Freedom of Speech, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 593, 597–98 (2013) 
(contrasting Brandenburg’s approach with Judge Learned Hand’s position that requires lower 
probability for more serious harms than for less serious harms). 
 396 See Masur, supra note 363, at 1309. 
 397 Id. at 1296. 
 398 Id. 
 399 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 360–61 (2003). 
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just any harm but grave harm. A cost-benefit analysis would require the 
judge to determine the approximate probability that a potential speech-
borne threat will materialize, estimate the magnitude of the damage that 
threat might cause, multiply the probability and magnitude to arrive at 
the expected outcome of permitting the speech to occur and then 
compare this outcome with the benefit that the judge expects the speech 
to confer.400 Importantly, incorporating the magnitude of the harm 
requirement into a cost-benefit analysis cuts both ways. On one hand, it 
ensures that the risk of merely minimal or trivial harm is insufficient to 
justify criminalization of endangerment speech crimes. On the other 
hand, however, it also ensures that the greater the potential harm that 
may flow from the speech is, the more compelling interest the 
government has to criminalize that speech. 
c.     Least Restrictive Means 
Another factor for evaluating the constitutionality of 
endangerment speech crimes is whether a criminal sanction, as opposed 
to less drastic forms of regulation, is the least restrictive means to satisfy 
the government’s compelling interest to ban a given speech. 
Commentators have long noted that criminal law is the strongest formal 
condemnation society can impose on individuals.401 It is a stringent 
weapon, capable of inflicting the harshest and most intrusive sanctions, 
subjecting defendants to numerous collateral consequences.402 Criminal 
law should, therefore, be used selectively and discriminately and only as 
a last resort when alternative and less restrictive sanctions fail.403 
Modern legislation often attempts to appear “tough on crime” and 
provide “quick fixes” to what the public perceives to be pressing 
problems by adopting harsh criminal sanctions.404 This often results in 
hasty legislative responses, substituting excessive use of the blunt 
criminal law for more moderate regulation. The upshot is that 
criminalization often serves as a first, rather than a last, resort in 
curbing harmful conduct.405 
The above legislative trend further contributes to the proliferation 
of endangerment speech crimes. Criminalizing cyberharassment is a 
 
 400 See Masur, supra note 363, at 1296 (explaining the components of the cost-benefit 
formula). 
 401 See Dubber, supra note 328, at 546. 
 402 See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral 
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999) (noting the collateral 
consequences of punishment). 
 403 See Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 211 
(2004). 
 404 See Stuntz, supra note 10, at 529–31. 
 405 See Nils Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 
523 (2005). 
BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL.36.5.2 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:27 PM 
2015] OVERCRIMINALIZING S PEEC H  1731 
 
case in point, as broadly worded prohibitions raise serious doubts as to 
whether these offer the least restrictive means to address its harms. 
Arguably, less intrusive measures, mainly civil and administrative 
remedies, including common law tort actions such as intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and defamation, as 
well as injunctions, may suffice and be more effective in curbing the 
injuries of cyberharassment.406 While a civil ban on cyberharassment 
may pass strict scrutiny review by satisfying the least restrictive means 
requirement, a criminal ban may fail to do so because civil measures 
offer less restrictive means to curtail this harmful speech.407 
2.     Internal Constraints on Criminalizing Speech 
As previously suggested, strict scrutiny review alone is insufficient 
to draw the legal boundary between speech that warrants criminal 
sanction and one that does not.408 The following factors, which stem 
from criminal law theory, provide additional limits on the scope of 
endangerment crimes. 
a.     The Perpetrator’s Dangerousness 
Establishing the defendant’s dangerousness is a key factor in 
limiting the scope of endangerment speech crimes. Speech becomes 
more dangerous as the gravity of the potential harm increases. When 
the harm threatened is not sufficiently serious, the speech is not 
dangerous enough to justify criminalization. Moreover, a defendant’s 
dangerousness may be defined in terms of the likelihood that her 
conduct will inflict harm.409 Speech becomes more dangerous when 
there is substantial probability that it would result in harmful conduct. 
The dangerousness requirement is, thus, closely linked to the above 
constitutional constraints. But the essential role that dangerousness 
assessments play in the criminal justice system calls for a separate 
discussion of this requirement. 
Dangerous determinations cut across the criminal justice system, 
prominently featuring in various stages of the criminal process.410 
Examples of situations in which the government engages in 
 
 406 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 710–12 (1931). But cf. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764–66 (1994). 
 407 Cf. Near, 283 U.S. at 715–16 (implying that the Constitution enables the distinction 
between permissible criminal and civil laws against libel on one hand and impermissible prior 
restraint of a publication). 
 408 See supra Part III.A. 
 409 See Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the Factors on 
Which Our Criminal Law is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REV. 283, 285–87 (1988). 
 410 See Slobogin, supra note 33, at 1–2. 
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dangerousness assessments include investigative stops by the police, 
pretrial detention, noncapital sentencing, and death penalty 
determinations.411 Dangerousness evaluations, however, also play a 
more tacit role in the realm of substantive criminal law, mainly with 
respect to inchoate crimes. The function of conspiracy law’s overt act 
requirement and attempt law’s substantial step requirement is to 
demonstrate the defendant’s dangerousness.412 The premise underlying 
these requirements is that a perpetrator becomes dangerous only by 
transforming plans and thoughts into real action. 
Demonstrating the perpetrator’s dangerousness becomes more 
challenging in cases where criminalization is grounded on speech alone, 
unaccompanied by tangible action. As previously noted, legislatures 
often criminalize risk-creating speech without requiring evidence of the 
perpetrator’s dangerousness.413 Prosecutors in turn bring charges for 
mere speech, absent of proof of the defendant’s dangerousness.414 These 
trends, thus, result in diluting the significance of the dangerousness 
element. By insisting that criminalization of speech is contingent on 
clear proof of the perpetrator’s dangerousness, the proposal advocated 
here reinvigorates the role that the dangerousness requirement must 
play in all endangerment speech crimes. 
b.     Distinguishing Criminal Wrongdoing from Civil Harm 
Another constraint on the criminalization of speech calls for a 
more principled distinction between conduct appropriately targeted 
through criminal law and one better targeted through civil measures. 
Current law often proves unsuccessful in drawing a meaningful line 
between these two types of regulation. This shortcoming may be traced 
to an ambiguity concerning the notion of criminal harm. In recent 
years, the harm principle has arguably become the main justification for 
criminal prohibitions.415 The term harm itself, however, is so elusive 
that it escapes a unanimous definition.416 Over the years, expansive 
harm definitions have enabled legislatures to use this principle to justify 
a myriad of criminal prohibitions.417 While originally the harm 
principle was perceived as a tool to limit the scope of criminal statutes, it 
 
 411 Id. 
 412 See Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action, 9 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 637, 644 (2012) (discussing the dangerousness requirement). 
 413 See supra Part I. 
 414 United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (2008) (elaborating on the significance of 
proving the defendant’s dangerousness). 
 415 See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 131–32 (1999) (discussing the triumph of the harm principle). 
 416 See Brown, supra note 336, at 971. 
 417 See Harcourt, supra note 415, at 139–40 (explaining how the harm principle justifies 
criminal statutes). 
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now serves to expand the scope of criminal regulation.418 The upshot of 
the overbroad definition of harm is that the criminal justice system 
conflates criminal and civil harms. 
To some theorists, the prevention of harm is a sufficient basis for 
criminalization.419 Others, however, insist that in addition to inflicting 
harm, an act should also have offended a moral wrong.420 While the 
notion of harm cuts across injuries addressed both in civil and in 
criminal law, it is simply an inadequate measure for evaluating whether 
criminal regulation is warranted. A distinct tenet of criminal harm is 
that it stems from a morally wrongful and blameworthy conduct.421 
Civil harm, by contrast, does not hinge on culpable behavior. 
Criminalizing endangerment speech is often inconsistent with 
these fundamental requisites. The case of verbal harassment is again 
illustrative. As previously suggested, using criminal sanctions to address 
the harms of cyberharassment is unwarranted in light of the numerous 
problems they create.422 Constitutional constraints, however, would not 
suffice to limit criminalization because the grave harms inflicted by 
cyberharassment may justify civil remedies that might satisfy the First 
Amendment’s least restrictive means requirement. While I concede that 
verbal harassment may inflict severe emotional harm, I also contend 
that this type of injury is typically not a criminal harm, therefore calling 
for a civil rather than a criminal sanction. Indeed, the intentional 
infliction of emotional harm is a recognized cause of action under tort 
law.423 Additional constraints must include not only serious harm but 
also normatively wrongful conduct justifying criminal sanction. The 
latter requirement may be lacking with respect to adolescents’ 
cyberharassment, where awareness of the elements of the offense is 
often absent. For these behaviors, civil sanctions may be more 
appropriate for achieving the goals of harm prevention. 
c.     Intent to Inflict Harm 
A final limit that draws a clearer distinction between criminal and 
noncriminal harm is proof that the perpetrator intended to inflict harm, 
or at least demonstrated willful blindness to the risk of causing harm. 
While intent is already a fundamental element of attempts and 
conspiracies, it is not a requisite element of all endangerment speech 
crimes. Take, for example, the offense of disorderly conduct in public 
 
 418 See Steven D. Smith, Is the Harm Principle Illiberal?, 51 AM. J. JURIS 1, 14 (2006). 
 419 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) 
(1859). 
 420 See MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 649 (2010). 
 421 See FEINBERG, supra note 393, at 116–18. 
 422 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 423 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. 
Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2011). 
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places, broadly proscribing various forms of behaviors, many of which 
are grounded solely in speech, arguably as a means to prevent the 
disturbance of public order.424 In Tobey v. Jones, a person was charged 
with disorderly conduct after he had removed his clothes when 
requested by Transportation and Security Administration agents to 
submit to enhanced screening at the airport, in order to expose the text 
of the Fourth Amendment, which he had written on his bare chest.425 
Tobey claimed that he was protesting against the government’s practice 
of enhanced screening, which he believed to violate his constitutional 
rights.426 Notably, the offense’s elements may be satisfied not only upon 
proof that the defendant intended to create a risk of public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, but also upon proof that he 
recklessly created such risk.427 
Evaluating the firmness of defendants’ intent is of particular 
significance in endangerment speech crimes because of the often-
ambiguous nature of speech. A defendant may engage in speech that 
threatens future harm without intending that others engage in conduct 
that ultimately inflicts the harm. Since individuals may abandon their 
risky endeavors even at the last moment, criminalization of 
endangerment speech ought to be limited only to cases where the 
defendant’s intent has already risen to the level of firm resolution to 
inflict harm. Merely taking a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
speech would result in harm should not suffice to uphold 
criminalization. 
Moreover, since criminalizing speech may be warranted when 
speech is aimed at leading others to commit crimes, evidence should be 
required to prove that the defendant intended to influence the listeners’ 
conduct, as opposed to their attitudes and beliefs.428 Criminalizing 
speech is unjustified if the speaker’s expression only aims at affecting 
others’ ideas. While such speech may contribute to an atmosphere of 
violence, changing people’s attitudes in itself is insufficient to justify 
criminalization.429 
 
 424 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-201 (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 
(West 2014) (proscribing disorderly conduct). 
 425 See Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 426 Id. at 383–84. The attorney for Henrico County then dropped the charge. Id. Tobey sued 
the agents and police officers, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accepted the 
argument that his action stated a cognizable First Amendment claim. Id. 
 427 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (West 2014) (stating that liability may be based on a mens 
rea of recklessness). 
 428 See Miriam Gur-Arye, Can Freedom of Expression Survive Social Trauma: The Israeli 
Experience, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 179 (2003) (noting the difference between affecting 
attitudes and behaviors). 
 429 Id. at 177 (rejecting criminalization based on the creation of an atmosphere of violence). 
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B.     A Test Case 
Heinous crimes of mass violence under International criminal law 
provide a powerful test case for applying the proposed constraints. The 
purpose of turning to this specific context is twofold: first, to 
demonstrate that even in the area of genocide, the most horrific type of 
mass atrocities, endangerment speech does not always justify 
criminalization. Second, to offer an analogy between the large-scale 
effects of genocide and those of terrorism by suggesting that similar 
constraints should be applied in both areas. 
Genocidal slaughter of the minority Tutsi by the majority Hutu 
was committed in 1994 in Rwanda, massacring between 500,000 and 
800,000 Rwandans.430 Several individuals were criminally charged in the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda for incitement to commit 
genocide.431 Among them was Simon Bikindi, an immensely popular 
Rwandan pop singer, and an extremist Hutu, who was charged based on 
two speech-related events. One count stemmed from an incident in 
which Bikindi rode in a truck with a loudspeaker, in an area where 
Tutsis have been massacred, urging militant Hutu to kill all surviving 
Tutsis.432 Another count alleged that Bikindi composed, performed, 
recorded, or disseminated musical compositions extolling Hutu 
solidarity, and characterizing Tutsi as enslavers of the Hutu. These 
compositions were subsequently deployed in a propaganda campaign to 
target Tutsi as the enemy and to instigate, incite, and encourage the 
Hutu population to separate themselves from the Tutsi and to kill 
them.433 The songs were disseminated at political rallies, radio 
broadcasts, pre-killing meetings, and Bikindi’s public speeches.434 
The International tribunal convicted Bikindi for incitement to 
genocide based only on his ride with the loudspeaker, reasoning that it 
amounted to direct call to Hutu militants to commit genocidal acts 
against individual Tutsis. Importantly, the tribunal acquitted Bikindi of 
the songs-based count, holding that there was insufficient evidence to 
prove that Bikindi composed the songs with specific intent to incite the 
killings.435 
 
 430 See Mark A. Drumbl, “She Makes Me Ashamed to Be a Woman”: The Genocide Conviction 
of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 2011, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 559, 560 (2013). 
 431 See Benesch, supra note 385, at 489. 
 432 See Gregory S. Gordon, Music and Genocide: Harmonizing Coherence, Freedom and 
Nonviolence in Incitement Law, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 607, 620–21 (2010). 
 433 Id. at 618–19. 
 434 Id. at 617. 
 435 See Benesch, supra note 385, at 493 (“[T]reaty law instructs only that to commit [the crime 
of] incitement to genocide: [(1)] one must have specific intent to cause genocide, and [(2)] the 
incitement must be direct and public.” (footnote omitted)). 
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To consider the application of the above proposal on Bikindi’s 
case, let us first frame the case in the context of American law by 
assuming that there was jurisdictional authority to prosecute Bikindi. It 
is reasonable to assume that in most jurisdictions, jurors would have 
convicted Bikindi of solicitation of murders or aiding and abetting these 
crimes based both on the truck ride event and on disseminating the 
songs.436 
Applying the proposed limits on Bikindi’s two speech-based 
charges would have resulted in conviction with respect to the truck ride 
event but in acquittal with respect to the inciting songs. As for the 
former charge, Bikindi would have been rightly convicted for explicitly 
calling to kill Tutsis because given the content and the context of his 
direct instruction to militants, there was a substantial probability that 
his call would result in genocidal acts. The basis for this conclusion rests 
with incorporating a probability assessment into the speech at issue. The 
magnitude of the harm—genocidal murders—plays an important role in 
a cost-benefit analysis of Bikindi’s speech because the costs of such 
speech clearly outweigh its benefits. Moreover, a direct call to militants 
to engage in genocidal acts demonstrates Bikindi’s dangerousness and 
his intent to cause genocide of Tutsis. 
In contrast, under the proposal Bikindi would likely not have been 
convicted for disseminating these songs for the following reasons. First, 
the government would have likely been unable to prove that there was 
substantial probability that the artistic expression of national sentiments 
would ensue in genocidal acts. Admittedly, the songs amounted to hate 
speech, consisting of abhorrent messages against Tutsi. But even the 
prosecution characterized them only as “songs [extolling] Hutu 
solidarity” rather than direct calls for the killing of Tutsis.437 Second, 
communicating extremist solidarity messages by an artist would have 
likely failed to prove Bikindi’s dangerousness. Third, the evidence 
would have likely failed to establish Bikindi’s intent to cause the 
genocide. Finally, even the suspect context, allegedly supporting 
conviction—given the facts that genocide had already occurred and 
Bikindi enjoyed immense influence among extremists—would have 
been insufficient to prove that the songs were likely to incite genocide. 
In sum, the guidelines provide a principled analytical framework for 
assessing the constitutionality of speech crimes, ensuring consistent 
outcomes in future cases. 
 
 436 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 373 (2012) (prohibiting solicitation to commit a crime of violence); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 653f (West 2014) (prohibiting the solicitation of commission of certain 
offenses). 
 437 See Gordon, supra note 432, at 619. 
BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL.36.5.2 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:27 PM 
2015] OVERCRIMINALIZING S PEEC H  1737 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has identified endangerment speech crimes as yet 
another example of legislatures’ excessive use of the preventive 
paradigm in the criminal justice system. It has demonstrated the ways in 
which these crimes have resulted in the overcriminalization of speech, a 
phenomenon that carries a host of unintended consequences not only 
from the perspective of the First Amendment but also from the 
perspective of substantive criminal law. 
The Article has argued that existing theories categorically 
excluding all speech acts from First Amendment scrutiny are 
responsible for the overcriminalization of speech. Having established 
that these theories are flawed, the Article has offered an alternative 
doctrinal scheme that would ameliorate the problem. The proposed 
analytical framework suggests that all speech crimes would be subject to 
strict scrutiny judicial review as well as to internal constraints arising 
from criminal law theory. 
While subjecting all speech crimes to these constraints is arguably 
more protective of speech, this Article nowhere suggests that all 
endangerment speech crimes are entitled to broader First Amendment 
protection. Admittedly, the First Amendment must yield when speech 
threatens grave harm to the nation or to specific individuals. Subjecting 
endangerment speech crimes to the proposed constraints would not 
result in granting constitutional protection to speech that warrants 
criminal sanctions. 
Many speech crimes are normatively justified and would pass 
constitutional muster, because the government would be able to 
demonstrate—based on a balancing process between competing 
interests—that the benefits of criminalization outweigh the costs it 
imposes on the right to speak. The proposal would therefore not 
frustrate the purposes of criminal law—mainly harm prevention and the 
deterrence of potentially dangerous conduct. Appropriate risk 
management, however, must account for the probability that grave 
harm would be inflicted. Applying strict scrutiny analysis to all 
endangerment speech crimes ensures that risk-creating speech is 
criminalized only once substantial likelihood of grave harm is 
established. Additionally, the use of the criminal law is justified only 
upon proof of truly dangerous behavior. 
